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Chapter 1
Introduction
Taxation is at the heart of modern welfare states. Governments collect taxes to
be able to provide public goods to the taxpayer.1 In this sense, the taxpayer
does not forfeit the money but benefits from public infrastructure, redistributive
systems and other services provided by the state. Yet, many people perceive
taxation to be unfair or too high (Blaufus et al., 2015) and some engage in
avoidance and evasion activities to minimise their individual tax burden (Mason
and Calvin, 1984).2 Others show real responses, such as the reduction of labour
supply (individuals) or productivity (firms). These behavioural responses induce
inefficiencies into the tax system that are economically undesirable. Efficient
tax policies should therefore aim at minimising the behavioural response to
distortions created by the tax system.
Since the first theoretical explorations into optimal taxation (Ramsey, 1927;
Mirrlees, 1971; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971a,b), both theoretical economists and
empiricists have thoroughly analysed the topic and its inherent equity-efficiency
1It is acknowledged that this is a modern view on taxation. Historically, taxes (or equivalent
policies such as the tithe) were also used for example as compensation, to finance wars or for
a kings daily living expenses.
2This can also be extended to firms.
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trade-off. From a theoretical point of view, extreme inequality can be a desirable,
efficient solution to the taxation problem (e.g. lump sum taxation), but this does
not satisfy the demands for equality expressed by parts of the population.3 The
optimal commodity taxation proposed by Ramsey (1927), for example, turns
out to be regressive, thus having a starker negative effect for poorer households,
which is not desirable from an equity point of view. Although this has been
mitigated somewhat in the analyses by Mirrlees (1971); Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971a,b), the general consensus in fiscal policy is therefore to accept a certain
level of inefficiency in favour of equity. So conditional on the level of equity
that is desirable and its inevitable level of inefficiency, the policymakers need to
decide on the tax policy that induces a minimum of additional inefficiency. The
aim is thus to find a second best solution to the taxation problem. To achieve
this goal, it is critical to understand the (behavioural) responses to various policy
instruments.
The thesis at hand intends to contribute to this understanding by dedicat-
ing each chapter to the analysis of a different fiscal policy instrument. Chapter
2 focusses on the individual tax system in the Netherlands that exhibits tax
brackets, as opposed to a smooth progressive tax system. The aim is to un-
cover the extent of behavioural responses to the kinks in the budget set that are
created by the non-linear increases in the marginal tax rates at the tax brack-
ets cutoff points. Chapter 3 discusses the implications of the introduction of
transfer pricing regulations (TPR) on intermediate goods trade. The chapter
thus analyses an anti-avoidance measure implemented by many governments in
recent years and evaluates the consequences for allocative and distributional ef-
ficiency. Chapter 4 deals with a recently developed tax incentive for research
3See Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for theories on inequality
aversion and Saez and Stantcheva (2016) for field-experimental evidence of social preferences
towards redistribution and hence, demand for equality.
2
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and development (R&D), namely the intellectual property box (IP-Box). Said to
foster innovation by the implementing governments, critics accuse the IP-Box
regimes of providing yet another profit shifting opportunity for multinational
enterprises (MNEs). The study assesses the implications that the introduction
of IP-Box regimes had on innovation and shifting behaviour, in order to judge
on the efficiency and effectiveness of such a policy instrument.
To sum up, the thesis delves into aspects of both individual and corporate
taxation at the national and international level, analyses tax schedules, tax
incentives as well as disincentives and ultimately tries to provide guidelines for
an efficient design of fiscal policy. Before the thesis turns to the in-depth analysis
of modern day tax systems, it is important to emphasise that the problem
of taxation and the question of how to tax are not new. To obtain a better
understanding of taxation and the various policy instruments that governments
have implemented in the past, a short overview of the history of taxation as
well as philosophical considerations on the justness of taxation are provided in
the following. This should enable the reader to put the results of this thesis
into perspective and highlight that the topic of efficient and just taxation was
as relevant 2000 years b.c. as it is 2000 years a.c..
The Roots of Taxation and Fiscal Policy4
If one wants to define the future, they must study the past
Confucius
The first records of taxation date back some 6000 years to the people of
Lagash in the Sumer plain, located between Euphrates and Tigris in modern
day Iraq. But the first extensively documented system of taxation was in place
4The narrative of this section draws heavily on Adams (1999)
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in ancient Egypt. The pharaoh was the owner of all land and the land was leased
to farmers, subject to the harvest tax. Alongside the taxation of agricultural
production, also sales, businesses as well as trade and even people were taxed.
In other words, the tax system of ancient Egypt was acquainted with an income
tax, a VAT, corporate taxation as well as tariffs for international trade, all
of which are tax policy instruments implemented to this day. To govern and
monitor taxation, the ancient Egyptians had a vast armada of scribes5 that
worked for the pharaoh and ensured the payment of taxes. The scribes had
great power in determining the taxes due and this inevitably led to corruption
within the system, which in turn slowly led to the downfall of the civilisation.
The downfall of the empire run by the pharaohs also documents the revolt of
people against unfair taxation and the subsequent engagement in evasion and
avoidance activities. The famous Rosetta Stone describes an amnesty offered
as a means to end a civil war, which was sparked by an uprising against high
taxation. In summary, ancient Egypt knew nearly all tricks of the trade when
it came to levying taxes, monitoring payments and dealing with delinquents.
The Egyptians succeeded at times in constructing a very efficient tax system,
especially before the scribes possessed too much power and corruption under-
mined the system. But for the peasants, taxation was hardly fair. The concept
of justness in the matter of taxation was introduced in an unprecedented and
in its thoroughness never again achieved form by the ancient Greeks, especially
in the state of Athens. Although Confucius and his successor Mencius in China
developed ideas of just taxation in the form of a 10% flat tax and the Well-Field
tax system6, as well as setting out principles that we would still consider as just
5The literal translation would be writers.
6The idea of the system is to divide land into nine equal squares. The eight squares
on the outside are for the farmers and their families, but the central square is public land,
cooperatively cultivated by the farmers that work on the surrounding squares. The produce
of this ninth square is the tax paid by the farmers.
4
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today7, it was the ancient Greeks who were able to lay the foundations for any
equity concerns in taxation that are still present nowadays.
The Athenians abolished direct taxation on themselves and advocated in-
direct taxation instead. Taxation fell on the use of public infrastructure in the
form of tolls, on sales and imports. This also ensured that most taxes were paid
by foreigners, who benefited from the infrastructure provided by the Athenians.
Athens also controlled the tax system of the Delian League, a defense league of
almost two hundred city-states, with each of its members paying a tribute to the
League. Aristides, an Athenian general, was appointed to oversee the collection
of the tribute. He determined the taxes due on a city-by-city basis and assessed
everyone according to ability and worth, hence introducing the first form of ver-
tical and horizontal tax equity. Moreover, Aristides succeeded in creating a tax
system that was considered as just and fair by all relevant parties, the Athenians
as well as the taxed city-states.
The concept of justness was also debated by the philosophers of the time.
Plato writes the following in Book 1 of The Republic: In a dialog between
Socrates and Thrasymachus, the latter explains that the just man will pay more
and the unjust man less on the same amount of money if there were an income
tax. Likewise, the just man will receive little and the unjust much if there
is something to give. Socrates argues against Thrasymachus that it is always
advantageous to be just (Bloom et al., 1991). Here, the justness of the taxpayer
is described and the argument is brought forward that the mode of taxation
doesn’t matter, for as long as taxpayers have heterogeneous levels of justness,
injustice, especially horizontal injustice, will be inherent to any tax system.
A second feat achieved by the Athenians was the collection and sharing of
public revenue without bureaucracy. The tax system was progressive and there
7Mencius advised that taxes should be paid on income, not gross production, double tax-
ation should be banished and tariffs should be abolished.
5
were tax exemptions for the poor, like in many countries today. But the main
source of public revenue came through the liturgy, a voluntary contribution to
a public good, which was enforced only by tradition and a great love for the
city. Whenever the public was in need of something, the richest men were called
upon to provide it, e.g. build a bridge, host athletic games or donate military
equipment. The liturgy thus worked in a similar way as modern day taxation
in that the rich provide something for the general public, but the fundamental
difference is that the government played no role in the management of the liturgy.
Nowadays, a significant portion of tax money is spent on governing it, on the
revenue but mostly on the expenditure side. This causes inefficiencies that were
not present with the liturgy.
For many decades, taxation in various forms was laid upon defeated nations
by the victors of a war. It was often seen as compensation for the losses suffered
during the war. But in the second century b.c., the Romans used taxation
as a means to topple the commercially powerful Rhodians. Rhodes was in a
key geographic location for any merchant that wanted to reach either Greece
or Rome and each ship that stopped in the harbour was subject to a 2 percent
harbour tax based on the value of their cargo. When Rhodes infuriated the
Romans by not supporting them in the war against Macedonia, the Roman
Senate established a free port on the Isle of Delos, thus creating the world’s first
tax haven. In one year, trade volumes passing through Rhodes declined by 85%
and this led to the economical destruction of Rhodes.
In summary, the ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilisations already
faced the topics of taxation that this thesis intends to discuss in the subsequent
chapters: How should an efficient tax system be designed? How can equity
concerns be incorporated? And most predominantly, how does taxation alter
behaviour? Ancient though these problems are, the current state of tax practices
6
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suggests that humanity has since not succeeded in finding a suitable answer to
any of these questions. As an example, the smorgasbord of tax systems in place
in Europe is described in the following, focussing especially on the different
aspects of personal and corporate taxation as well as tax incentives.8 This
should lay a foundation for the in-depth analysis to come in the subsequent
chapters. It can also show how the results derived in this thesis apply to a
broader range of countries that have similar tax systems in place.
Overview of Taxation in Europe
If the ultimate tax system already existed, we would expect to see countries
with similar tax systems. But even in a geographically close and economically
integrated area like Europe, where most countries are part of the same union,
vast differences between tax systems can be observed.
Table 1.1 summarises the different tax schemes in place in the EU. Whilst
almost all countries have a single flat tax rate in place for corporate income,
individual taxation follows more diverse patterns. Some of the former Soviet
countries (e.g. Bulgaria, the Baltic countries or Hungary) have followed Russia
in experimenting with a flat tax rate for individual income, some countries im-
plement tax brackets with progressive marginal income tax rates (e.g. Belgium,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and there are also countries that have
a (more or less) smoothly increasing marginal tax rate (e.g. Denmark, Germany
and Sweden).
Next to the structure of the tax scheme, the tax rates also vary considerably
between the EU member states. Those countries implementing a flat tax rate
8Note that the sole existence of differences in taxation across countries does not necessarily
show that taxation is inefficient. In open economies however, like in the EU, tax systems should
aline to minimise the possibilities that taxees have to avoid taxation.
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Table 1.1: Tax Systems in the EU
Country Corporate Tax Individual Tax
Austria 25% flat rate progressive rates
Belgium 33.99% flat rate; under cer-
tain conditions (SME) progress-
ive rate
progressive rate, 5 brackets
Bulgaria 10% flat rate 10% flat rate
Croatia 20% flat rate progressive, 4 brackets
Cyprus 12.5% flat rate progressive, 5 brackets
Czech Republic 19% flat rate 15% flat rate
Denmark 23.5% flat rate progressive
Estonia 20% flat rate 20% flat rate
Finland 20% flat rate progressive, 6 brackets
France 33.33% flat rate; 15% for SME progressive, 5 brackets
Germany 15% flat rate progressive marginal rate in-
creases smoothly with income
Greece 29% flat rate progressive, 4 brackets
Hungary 10% below HUF 500 million of
the positive tax base and 19%
over HUF 500 million of the pos-
itive tax base
16% flat rate
Ireland 12.5% on trading income, 25% on
non-trading income
progressive, 3 brackets
Italy 27.5% flat rate progressive, 6 brackets
Latvia 15% flat rate; 9% for SME 23% flat rate
Lithuania 15% flat rate; 9% for SME 15% flat rate
Luxembourg 21% flat rate progressive, 19 brackets
Malta 35% flat rate progressive, 4 brackets
Netherlands first bracket: 20%, second
bracket 25% (above e 200,000)
progressive, 4 tax brackets
Poland 19% flat rate progressive, 3 brackets
Portugal 21% flat rate; 17% for SME progressive, 6 brackets
Romania 16% flat rate 16% flat rate
Slovakia 22% flat rate progressive, 3 brackets
Slovenia 17% flat rate progressive, 5 brackets
Spain 28% flat rate; 25% for SME progressive, 6 brackets
Sweden 22% flat rate progressive
United Kingdom 20% flat rate progressive, 4 brackets
Notes: This table shows the anatomy of the different corporate and individual income tax
systems in place across the EU-28. SME refers to special tax rates for small and medium
enterprises. The data are taken from European Commission et al. (2015).
8
Chapter 1
for personal income exhibit relatively low tax rates, Latvia’s (23%) being the
highest. In contrast, the Scandinavian countries all have very high top marginal
tax rates surpassing 50%, which is due to the financing of extensive redistribution
systems. So another problem related to the structural differences between the
tax schemes of EU countries is the difference in redistribution systems.9 This
has to be kept in mind when discussing optimal tax policies.
For the corporate tax rate, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus and Ireland are at the
lower end of the scale with statutory tax rates of 10-12.5%. At the top, France
(33.33%), Belgium (33.99%) and Malta (35%) stand out. As will be shown in
more detail in Chapter 3, companies react sensitively to taxation with respect
to their location decision. Therefore, the significant differences in corporate tax
rates (25 percentage points) within the EU suggest that the corporate tax rate
is, at least partly, utilised to attract MNEs.
Strategically setting corporate tax rates is one possibility to use the tax
system as an incentive device. But across the EU, several other tax incentives
exist, both in personal and corporate taxation. For personal income, deduction
possibilities such as for children or training, are present in all EU member states.
Those deductions could be used strategically by individuals to lower taxable
income, especially in countries that exhibit tax brackets. Such a case is analysed
thoroughly in Chapter 2.
Corporations also face several tax incentives, such as the deductability of
costs from the tax base and incentives to foster R&D. R&D is a very risky,
yet crucial element of success for a corporation, because it enables the growth
of a firm. To make the risk economically bearable, many countries implement
tax incentives for R&D, recognising that R&D has the characteristics of a public
9Tiebout (1956) argues that differences in redistributive systems reflect individual prefer-
ences and are therefore no sign of inefficient taxation. But given that redistribution is a public
good, free riding becomes a major problem, especially with the Freedom of Movement Act in
the EU.
9
Table 1.2: Popularity of R&D Tax Incentive Instruments
Countries Tax Credits Enhanced allowance Accelerated depreciation IP-Box
Austria x
Belgium x x x
Bulgaria x x
Croatia x
Cyprus x x
Czech Republic x x
Denmark x x x
Estonia
Finland x x
France x x
Germany
Greece x x
Hungary x x
Ireland x
Italy x x
Latvia x
Lithuania x x
Luxembourg x
Malta x x
Netherlands x x x
Poland x x
Portugal x x
Romania x x
Slovakia x
Slovenia x x
Spain x x
Sweden x
United Kingdom x x x x
Notes: This table shows different tax incentives for R&D in the EU-28. IP-Box refers to
intellectual property boxes. The data are taken from CPB et al. (2015).
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good and without government intervention, an underprovision of R&D is a likely
outcome. Innovations coming from R&D, unless strongly protected by patents,
can be utilised by anyone without incurring additional costs and there will be
non-rivalry in consumption. This creates further disincentives for R&D from a
firm’s perspective.
The responses of firms specifically to such tax incentives are analysed in
Chapter 4, where effects of intellectual property boxes (IP-Boxes) are discussed.
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the types of R&D tax incentives that are
in place across the EU. Although there are several arguments in favour of in-
centivising R&D, Estonia and Germany implement no incentive instrument at
all. On the other end of the scale, the United Kingdom utilises all four in-
struments to increase investments into R&D. There is a fundamental difference,
however, between tax credits, enhanced allowances accelerated depreciation (the
first three incentives in Table 1.2) and IP-Boxes (the fourth incentive in Table
1.2). Tax credits, enhanced allowances and accelerated depreciation all aim at
reducing the costs of R&D, either the employment costs or the general develop-
ment costs. Thus they subsidise the inputs of the R&D process and are therefore
also available to unsuccessful projects. IP-Boxes on the other hand target the
output of the R&D process and thus by definition only subsidise successful R&D.
Whilst the first three instruments thus directly target an increase in innovative
activity, this link remains in the dark for IP-Boxes and Chapter 4 is dedicated
to identifying this link.
This section provided a very brief overview of some of the characteristics
of the tax systems that are in place across the EU. It showed that no country
taxes like the other, which indicates that the optimal tax system is yet to be
discovered. Neither the tax rates themselves, nor the number or extent of tax
incentives are the same in any two member states of the EU. Through the in-
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depth analysis of certain aspects of tax systems, this thesis aims at providing
a better understanding of those tax systems and potentially provide guidelines
that could lead to an alignment of tax systems across the EU.
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A Data-Driven Procedure to
Determine the Bunching
Window
2.1 Introduction
A central topic in public economics is the assessment of welfare losses caused by
behavioural responses to income taxation. Following the seminal paper by Feld-
stein (1995), a large literature emerged where welfare losses are inferred from
the elasticity of taxable income (ETI).1 Notwithstanding the large variation in
identification strategies and data used in these studies, a common finding is
that the elasticities and thus the tax-induces welfare losses are modest. Recent
studies hint at different explanations for these modest estimates, such as op-
timisation frictions (Bastani and Selin, 2014; Chetty et al., 2011), shifting of
income over time (Le Maire and Schjerning, 2013) or shifting across tax bases
(Harju and Matikka, 2016). More fundamentally, other papers claim that the
1See Saez et al. (2012) for a comprehensive overview.
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structural parameter cannot be retrieved from these estimates, because the ETI
depends on the institutional framework, such as the exact definition of taxable
income (Slemrod, 1998; Saez et al., 2012; Doerrenberg et al., 2017).
A growing strand of the literature utilises the bunching method to obtain
a non-parametric estimate of the ETI (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011).2 This
method exploits the clustering behaviour of individuals at kinks in a non-linear
tax system3 to identify the ETI by the number of individuals that adjust their
income to stay below the threshold of a tax bracket. Using the bunching method
is attractive as it builds on a sound theoretical foundation and is not susceptible
to endogeneity biases, a problem suffered by previous ETI literature (Saez, 2010;
Gruber and Saez, 2002; Weber, 2014).
The aim of our study is twofold: First, we tackle the issue of finding an
optimal bunching window, which is necessary as individuals are not able to
perfectly adjust their taxable income to the tax threshold. The large num-
ber of robustness checks in previous studies already hints at the uncertainty
regarding the optimal choice of the bunching window and the appropriate coun-
terfactual model. However, using the correct, potentially asymmetric bunching
window is crucial for the unbiasedness of the ETI as it does not only enter the
estimation of the excess mass of individuals around the threshold but also dir-
ectly affects the estimation of the counterfactual density following Chetty et al.
(2011) that is needed to derive the elasticity. We therefore propose a simple,
data-driven procedure to determine the bunching window. This improves on the
visual inspection that determines the bunching window in the previous literat-
ure. As a consequence, our method explicitly allows the bunching window to
be asymmetric around the threshold and to be more flexible. It also enhances
the reproducibility of studies implementing the bunching approach. Second, we
2For an overview of the recent advances in the bunching literature see Kleven (2016).
3Kinks appear at thresholds in a tax schedule, where marginal tax rates jump up.
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estimate the compensated elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-
of-tax rate in the Netherlands using the refined bunching approach. We employ
a unique longitudinal data set containing exact declared taxable income and tax
deductions for a representative sample of the Dutch population (IPO data from
2003 to 2014). Information on taxable income and deductions is provided by
the Dutch tax authority and, therefore, free of measurement errors – something
that is vital to obtain reliable estimates with the bunching method. Since we
observe the exact taxable income, we do not need to rely on imputation tech-
niques. The data also contains covariates, such as gender and marital status
as well as information on self-employment, which enable us to analyse various
sub-samples. In addition, we are able to analyse the anatomy of responses using
information on mortgage interest deductions.
Our main findings are as follows. First, Monte Carlo simulations show our
refinement of the bunching method to be robust to various changes in key para-
meters, such as different binwidths, sample sizes, tax rate changes and degrees
of optimisation frictions. This consistency of the approach is a valuable addi-
tion to the literature that has previously relied on visual inspection. Second,
in our empirical application, we estimate an ETI with respect to the net-of-tax
rate of 0.023 at the highest tax threshold, significant at the one-per-cent level.
This result is in line with some of the bunching literature, such as in Chetty
et al. (2011), who find an elasticity below 0.02 for their full sample of Denmark,
but differs from, for example, Bastani and Selin (2014) who report an elasticity
of only 0.004 for Swedish tax payers. Third, we find significantly higher com-
pensated ETIs for women and self-employed individuals. However, contrary to
most other studies, we are also able to identify a non-zero elasticity for individu-
als in paid employment. Fourth, by analysing the anatomy of response, we find
that most employees reduce their taxable income by utilising mortgage interest
15
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deductions. Further exploration reveals that this effect is driven by joint filers
that have the possibility to shift these deductions between them.
The paper proceeds with Section 2.2, which introduces the bunching meth-
odology as well as our improvements. Subsequently, the institutional setting
and the data are presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Section 2.5
presents our estimation results. Section 2.6 provides the conclusions.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Bunching
There are three potential ways in which individuals can respond to taxation.
The first is a real response. As suggested by standard microeconomic theory, the
distortion of prices and wages in the economy due to taxation induces individuals
to adjust their working hours and effort as well as their educational or training
decisions. The second response is legal tax avoidance, such as using deductions
or moving income to other time periods to reduce the taxable income in the
current period. The third type of response is illegal tax evasion. To test the
prediction from microeconomic theory and to quantify the responses, we follow
the literature and identify the compensated ETI in the spirit of Feldstein (1995),
which is a summary statistic for all kinds of behavioural responses. This central
parameter is defined as the percentage change in taxable income z due to an
increase in the net-of-tax rate (1− τ) of one percent:
e(z) =
dz
z
/d(1− τ)
(1− τ) . (2.1)
Theoretically, the introduction of a kink in the budget set of individuals
induces bunching behaviour within a certain income range, provided that pref-
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erences are convex and smoothly distributed among the population. This will
lead to a spike in the density exactly at the kink, but due to adjustment costs
and optimisation frictions, a bunching window around the kink is observed more
often in reality (Chetty et al., 2011). Comparing the income density with a coun-
terfactual scenario without a kink, the excess mass of taxpayers can be used to
determine the elasticity e(z). A detailed derivation of the bunching estimator
can be found in Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011). The compensated ETI,
identified locally at the threshold k, is then given by
e(k) =
b
k · log(1−τ1
1−τ2 )
, (2.2)
where the net-of-tax rate changes by log(1−τ1
1−τ2 ) per-cent.
4 The relative excess
mass of taxpayers at the threshold k is given by b, which is the only parameter
that needs to be estimated. To estimate b, Chetty et al. (2011) propose to
determine the counterfactual density by running a local polynomial regression
on binned data, while excluding data bins within the bunching window.
A major drawback of the bunching method is that it is sensitive to the choice
of bunching window (Adam et al., 2015). A commonly used approach is that
of selecting the window by visual inspection, which makes it vulnerable as it is
selected at the researcher’s discretion. Furthermore, recently published papers
select the counterfactual by trial-and-error and the model seems to be chosen
ad libitum. Neither visual inspection, nor this selection of the counterfactual
model are optimal for efficiency, reliability and reproducibility of the results.
4It is identified if and only if the derivative of the counterfactual density function h0(z)
with respect to z is continuous in z ∀z.
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2.2.2 Extension
Motivated by the drawbacks of the usual implementation of the bunching ap-
proach, we extend the estimation procedure by relying on the data at hand
rather than on visual inspection to determine the bunching window. Remov-
ing the researcher’s discretion in this matter is preferable in its own right, but
we also argue that our method produces more efficient estimates of the elasti-
city. The optimal situation would be for the bunching window to comprise all
the individuals who would adjust their taxable income as a response to the
tax change at the threshold and only those. The bunching window should not
be too small, for fear of omitting some taxpayers that attempt to bunch at
the kink, nor should it be too large, which would bias the results by also in-
cluding non-bunchers. The existing literature implements symmetric bunching
windows around the kink with varying sizes that are determined by graphical
inspection. We propose the use of a possibly asymmetric bunching window with
an endogenously determined size.5 One argument in favour of an asymmetric
bunching window is that risk-averse individuals are expected to be more likely
to over-adjust their income to make sure they realise an income which is below
the threshold. Furthermore, recent empirical evidence shows that individuals
have difficulties in understanding the difference between average and marginal
tax rates, leading to suboptimal behaviour (Ito, 2014). These cognitive and
psychological components might lead to an asymmetric bunching window. A
graphical intuition is given in Figure 2.1 for the simple case of a linear coun-
terfactual model.6 The figure plots taxable income (relative to the threshold)
5Using an optimal window renders robustness checks with different bunching windows
obsolete. To show the gain in efficiency, Figure 2.B.3 of the Appendix depicts a comparison
with two different model specifications.
6For illustrative purposes, we depict a linear counterfactual model. In our empirical ap-
plication, the counterfactual is allowed to be a higher order polynomial model, determined by
the minimum BIC value.
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Figure 2.1: Data-driven Procedure to Determine the Bunching Window
Distance to the threshold
F
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Notes: This figure shows the bin midpoints as well as the fitted values of a linear
regression. The grey confidence band is calculated with the standard errors of the
point prediction. Here, five subsequent bin midpoints around the threshold lie outside
and therefore determine the relevant (asymmetric) bunching window.
against the number of individuals within certain income bins. All subsequent
binpoints around the threshold that have a higher actual number of taxpayers
than predicted (coloured in red) are then used to determine the bunching win-
dow. In order to determine its optimal width, we propose the following step-wise
procedure:
1. Set an excluded region around the threshold.
2. Run a local regression through all data bins outside the excluded region
and predict the frequencies.
3. Compute a confidence interval around the prediction.
4. Subsequent bin midpoints outside the confidence interval comprise the
bunching window.
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In general, the excluded region can be set arbitrarily; however, we propose
to iterate through different combinations of upper and lower bounds of the
excluded region. This hedges against concerns that the chosen excluded region
could affect the determination of the bunching window.7 The confidence band
should be set using standard significance levels, with higher levels tending to
lead to a smaller bunching window. In other words, the probability that we
erroneously include non-bunchers decreases. Depending on the setting and the
data, this will lead to more conservative estimates of the elasticity.
The bunching window is formally derived as follows: Let x− ∈ {−X, (−X +
1), . . . , 0} and x+ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , X} be the respective lower and upper bound
of the excluded region, where X represents the midpoint of an income bin.
Furthermore, define l(x−, x+) as the lower bound of the bunching window and
u(x−, x+) as the upper bound, given the excluded region from [x−, x+]. For
every tuple (x−, x+), run a local regression of polynomial order q:
N˜BWj =
q∑
i=0
βiX
i
j + εj ∀ j /∈ [x−, x+]. (2.3)
Then predict the counterfactual values NˆBWj and the associated standard error
of the forecast:
NˆBWj =
q∑
i=0
βˆiX
i
j ∀ j (2.4)
As a next step, calculate the upper value of the confidence interval CI+j for
a given t-value using standard procedures. To determine whether there are
more individuals than predicted in an income bin j, subtract the CI+j from the
7Our results indicate virtually no sensitivity of the bunching window to the size of the
excluded region.
20
Chapter 2
observed number of taxpayers for each j:
Ej = Nj − CI+j . (2.5)
A positive Ej means that the number of individuals in income bin j exceeds
the predicted number of individuals, as estimated by the polynomial regression.
Put differently, if all Ej are negative, no bunching is present in the respective
sample. Otherwise, the lower bound of the bunching window is given by:
l(x−, x+) = j∗l + 1, where j
∗
l = max{j ∈ Z− : Ej < 0} (2.6)
which is the smallest subsequent income bin j that still satisfies the condition
Ej > 0. Similarly, the upper bound is given by:
u(x−, x+) = j∗u − 1, where j∗u = min{j ∈ Z+ : Ej < 0} (2.7)
which is the largest subsequent income bin j that still satisfies the condition
Ej > 0.
By following this procedure, depending on the number of iterations with
respect to the choice of the excluded region, different values are obtained for
the lower and upper bounds of the bunching window. Several possibilities arise
for which values of l(x−, x+) and u(x−, x+) to use as the limits of the bunching
window, but we advocate using the mode of all estimated values. This ensures
that, in most cases, the exact bounds of the bunching window will be obtained.8
To estimate the ETI from Equation (2.2), the excess mass b is the only para-
meter that needs to be estimated, as the other parameters are known policy
8Other possibilities would be to use the minimum, maximum or mean, although we do not
find large variations among these choices.
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parameters. b is estimated in the following way:
bˆ =
Bˆ∑u
l Nˆj
(u−l+1)
, (2.8)
with Bˆ being the number of individuals within the bunching window. Nˆj rep-
resents the counterfactual number of individuals within an income bin j that
are determined by local polynomial regression of the form:
Nˆj =
q∑
i=0
βi ·X ij +
u∑
s=l
γs · I[Xj = s] + εj. (2.9)
Next to the data driven procedure for the determination of the bunching win-
dow, we rely on the Freedman-Diaconis rule to determine the optimal bin size in
each estimation. It states that the optimal binwidth is given by: 2 · IQR(x) ·n 13
(Freedman and Diaconis, 1981).9 Prior works have chosen a single binwidth
for their analysis and subsequently altered the binwidth in robustness checks to
show that the estimates are robust to the choice of the binwidth. The size of
the optimal binwidth, however, should depend on the number of observations
around the threshold and therefore be determined for each threshold separately.
In addition, we use the BIC criterion to determine the optimal number of poly-
nomials when running the local regression.
2.2.3 Evaluation
Our preferred method of validation for the endogenous procedure to determ-
ine the bunching window would be to replicate previous studies that detected
the bunching window by eyeballing. In the taxation literature, however, most
bunching studies rely on administrative datasets of personal taxable income,
9IQR stands for interquartile range.
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which are not freely available to other researchers. For example, Danish micro
data as used by Chetty et al. (2011) can only be accessed through a Danish part-
ner institution and the restricted PSID files used by Saez (2010) significantly
differ from the public use files and are hard to obtain outside the US. There-
fore, we assess the validity of our endogenously determined bunching window by
Monte Carlo simulations and evaluate the performance for two predictions: how
well the approach can recover the true elasticities and how well it can identify
the bunching individuals. Moreover, we test the robustness of our approach by
varying the key parameters of the model. We especially examine the variations
in binwidth, amount of frictions, sample size and size of the tax change at the
threshold. In a second exercise, we also vary the threshold and compare our
results to two standard approaches from the literature.
The baseline simulation consists of N = 1, 000, 000 observations drawn from
a triangular distribution.10 It has a threshold k at z = 50, 000, a binwidth of
100, and a tax change of 10 percentage points.11 We run estimations for three
true elasticities: e = 0.02, e = 0.1 and e = 0.5. As the bunching literature tends
to find small elasticities, the paper only reports the detailed results for e = 0.02,
although the results for the larger elasticities are in line with e = 0.02.
A comparison of the income distribution exhibiting a kink with a counterfac-
tual scenario without a kink can be used to determine the elasticity (see Section
2.1). Potential incomes z0 are used to calculate pre- and post-reform taxable
incomes z1 and z2 respectively, where z1 = z2 for all individuals who would be
at or below the kink, as they would not be affected by the new tax system.12 We
10Because we draw from a triangular distribution, we know that the counterfactual model
is best approximated by a linear model
11More specifically, the change is from 42% to 52%, resembling the change at the top tax
threshold in the Netherlands.
12The choices of z1 and z2 come from maximising a quasi-linear utility function. The
approach is similar to the approach taken in the working paper version of Bastani and Selin
(2014).
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identify all individuals as bunchers that have their highest post-reform utility
at income level k, provided they had z1 > k. To model optimisation frictions,
we introduce a random component in the income of the bunching individuals,
described by ε ∼ N(0, 142.3) in our baseline specification.13
Table 2.1 shows the results of our Monte Carlo simulations. The columns
present the difference between the true and simulated elasticity as well as the
ratio of identified bunchers to actual bunchers, which resembles an estimation
error. Each row represents a different specification. In the baseline setting, the
estimated elasticities have a mean very close to the true elasticity of e = 0.02.
At the same time, we are able to identify 98.92% of the bunchers using our
data-driven procedure. To assess the robustness of our approach we change the
size of key parameters.
Throughout the bunching literature, various binwidths are implemented.
Many studies alter the binwidth in robustness checks and show limited sens-
itivity to changes in the binwidth (Chetty et al., 2011; Bastani and Selin, 2014).
The results in Table 2.1 show no significant changes regarding the estimated
elasticities. A greater binwidth naturally would improve the identification of
the number of bunchers by up to almost 100 %, but the number of individu-
als wrongly assumed as bunching would also rise with an increased binwidth
(bias-efficiency trade off).
Next to the binwidth, the variance that represents optimisation frictions
could affect the performance of our data-driven procedure. Indeed, increasing
the variance term in the randomised component has a severely negative effect on
the performance of the bunching estimator. The bias increase to around −0.007
which is far off the true elasticity and are only able to identify 59.65% of the
13The variance component comes from the working paper version of Bastani and Selin (2014)
and is adjusted for Euro values. It is a function of working hours and the average wage. To
check for sensitivity, it is altered in a later specification.
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Table 2.1: Monte-Carlo Simulations for e = 0.02
Bias Ratio
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Baseline -0.0001 0.0003 0.9892 0.0038
Binwidth
200 0 0.0004 0.9905 0.1085
400 0.0003 0.0004 0.99998 0.00003
Variance (t=1.96)
100 0.0014 0.0006 0.9876 0.0017
300 -0.0067 0.0005 0.5956 0.0069
Variance (t=1)
100 0 0.0007 0.9917 0.0043
300 -0.0005 0.0011 0.9622 0.0189
Observations
550, 000 -0.0006 0.0011 0.9606 0.0233
2, 050, 000 -0.0002 0.0005 0.9867 0.0066
Tax Change
42%− 48% -0.0008 0.0013 0.9466 0.0231
42%− 60% -0.0002 0.0004 0.9887 0.0039
Notes: This table shows the results from the Monte Carlo simulations run-
ning 600 repetitions. The baseline consists of binwidth 100, variance 142.3,
observations 1,000,000 and tax change 42%-52%. All specifications use a
t-value of 1.96, except the third, which uses a t-value of 1. Note that a bias
of zero indicates that the bias is less than 1/10000.
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bunching taxpayers. A potential driver behind this could be the choice of con-
fidence interval. A high confidence interval should provide a narrow bunching
window. But because the optimisation frictions are so high, we would expect
a much wider range of the bunching window as well as a flatter area of excess
mass around the kink point. Therefore, for the third specification, we use a
t-value of 1 instead of 1.96. The results improve significantly, and our proced-
ure is able to identify 96.22% of all bunching individuals when the variance
term is 300. In light of this, researchers should take the anticipated amount of
optimisation frictions into account when setting the t-value for the confidence
interval. For example, a more complex or dynamic tax system should lead to
more optimisation frictions.
Because of its non-parametric nature, the bunching estimator relies on a
large sample size. We test the impact of different sample sizes on the efficiency
of our estimation procedure. As expected, we find that an increased sample size
increases efficiency, although the gains asymptotically decrease to zero. This is
in line with earlier findings, but our approach is also able to estimate the true
elasticity in smaller samples with little bias. In addition to the sample size,
the size of the tax change might also influence the estimation of the ETI. As
larger tax rate changes have more severe consequences for individuals, we should
observe more precise bunching with greater tax rate differences, as the costs of
adjusting taxable income are increasingly outweighed by the benefits (Chetty
et al., 2011). The true elasticity can be identified more precisely by increasing
the size of the difference between the two marginal tax rates, which confirms
the results by Bastani and Selin (2014) and Chetty (2012) that larger jumps in
the marginal tax rate are more informative of the true ETI.
All of the above variations have been made using a linear counterfactual and
a threshold of 50, 000. In a second step, we model a more realistic, log-normal
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income distribution to ensure that the results do not hinge on the location of the
threshold within the income distribution, which at k = 50, 000 is in the descend-
ing part. We rerun the simulation for different thresholds, namely k = 10, 000,
k = 20, 000 and k = 40, 000, which are in the ascending, flat and descending part
of the income distribution, respectively (see Figure 2.B.1 of the Appendix). The
bias at the lower threshold of 10, 000 is larger than in the baseline (−0.0021), but
outperforms a small as well as a large symmetric bunching window on the basis
of the RMSE.14 The results at the middle and upper threshold are very close to
the baseline results and suggest that the endogenous procedure to determine the
bunching window is robust to the location of the threshold. Again, the RMSE
suggests that the endogenous detection of the bunching window delivers the best
results.
2.3 Institutional Background
The Dutch tax system is almost fully individualised and tax liabilities mainly de-
pend on individual worldwide income. However, there are a few exceptions, two
of which are relevant for our analysis. The first exception is that of means-tested
subsidies, such as on health tax, child care and rent, which are all based on tax-
able household income. The second is that personal tax-favoured expenditures
are transferable between partners, thus reducing taxable income. This last pos-
sibility is attractive under a progressive tax schedule such as that of the Dutch
tax on labour income.15
Since 2001, income from different sources is treated in three different “boxes”,
14Small is defined as going from three binpoints below the threshold to three binpoints
above, whilst large covers seven binpoints below and above the threshold.
15From a labour supply perspective, a third exception is also relevant. A non-working spouse
can transfer the lump-sum tax credit to his or her partner. The moment this spouse starts
working, their income will be taxed starting at the marginal tax rate. This, however, is not
the focus of our study.
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each with its own taxable income concept and tax schedule. In Box 1, income
from profits, employment and home ownership is taxed. This includes wages,
pensions and social transfers. Box 2 consists of income from substantial share-
holding such as dividends and capital gains. Any other income from savings and
investments is taxed in Box 3. Income in Box 1 is taxed at progressive rates
that jump up at certain thresholds and thus create kinks in the tax schedule,
whereas income in Box 2 and Box 3 is subject to a flat tax, that, in 2014, was
25% and 30% respectively.16 For our analysis, we exploit the kinks in the Box
1 tax schedule for identification. It is furthermore worth noting that income
losses in one box cannot be used to counterbalance taxable income in one of the
others.
Income in Box 1, minus personal deductions, is taxed at progressive tax rates.
It is important to note that the tax rates in the first and second tax bracket
also include a social security contribution of around 31% for old-age pensions
and exceptional medical expenses. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the Dutch
tax schedule in 2014. The marginal tax rate is represented by the solid line.
In 2014, there is an increase in the marginal tax rate of 8 percentage-points at
the first threshold. The social security contribution in the third tax bracket is
compensated by an equal rise in tax rate in the second tax bracket, implying
that marginal tax rates in the second and third brackets are exactly the same.
However, there is a large jump in the marginal tax rate, from 42% to 52%, in
the last bracket.
While the upper two tax rates stayed constant over the whole sample period,
there exists some variation over time for the lower two tax rates. Figure 2.B.2
graphically illustrates the development of each marginal tax rate over time, again
16We are aware of the possibility of moving income between the boxes, which could be
especially pronounced for self-employed individuals. For information on the importance of
shifting between tax bases see Harju and Matikka (2016). Because of data limitations, we are
unable to extend our analysis in that way.
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Figure 2.2: Tax Schedule of 2014, Box 1
Taxable Income (in e)
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Notes: The figure shows marginal tax rates for the year 2014. At each threshold, denoted
by the dashed lines, the marginal tax rate jumps up, except for the second threshold,
where the tax rate and the social security contributions in the lower bracket equal the
marginal tax rate in the higher bracket.
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adding the social security contributions for the lower two tax brackets. Due
to the stability of the two upper tax rates, this large jump of 10 percentage-
points was existent in all years since 2001. Finally, is worth noting that for the
considered time period, the income thresholds were adjusted upwards to account
for inflation and to avoid the phenomenon of “cold progression” (see Table 2.B.1
in the Appendix).17
To assess the welfare losses due to taxation and better understand how indi-
viduals adjust their taxable income, it is essential to know the exact definition
of taxable income. An overview of the computation of taxable income in the
Netherlands is given in Table 2.2. One important channel of adjusting taxable
income is legal tax avoidance by utilising deductions (Chetty et al., 2011). In
our setting, these deduction possibilities include alimonies paid, charitable giv-
ings, health expenditures or mortgage interest deductions.18 In the Netherlands,
the mortgage interest deduction is quite high and common among house-owners.
More importantly, all of these deductions can be shifted between partners.
Finally, important for any analysis looking on bunching is the exact tax pay-
ment procedure which has an influence on the technical possibilities to avoid or
evade taxes. Three things are worth noting here. First, it should be emphasised
that for people in paid employment, their employer withholds income tax from
the income taxed under Box 1, which can be seen as a prepayment credited
against the final tax amount payable at the end of the year. This “third-party
reporting” is important for the interpretation of the results as it makes system-
atic tax evasion – one way of adjusting taxable income – more difficult (Kleven
et al., 2011). Final income taxes are determined after the end of the fiscal
year, when tax deductions and income from other sources are all taken into
17Given the specific values of the thresholds, which are never a multiple of one hundred, we
are less concerned with round number bunching (Kleven and Waseem, 2013).
18These are (at least in parts) common in other countries like Great Britain or Germany.
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Table 2.2: Definition Taxable Income Box 1
Gross Wage
– Pension fund and unemployment insurance contributions employee
+ Health insurance contribution employer
= Taxable Labour Income
+ Income from housing
+ Freelance earnings
– Alimony/maintenance paid
– Charity donations
– Mortgage interest deductions
– Health expenses deduction
– Other personal deductables
= Taxable Income Box 1
Notes: This table shows the computation of Box 1 taxable income. Gross wage
includes pension benefits and received social transfers.
account.19 Second, an important distinction is single filing or joint filing of tax
returns. Even though the Dutch tax system is rather individualised, married
couples can choose to file their returns jointly. In addition, cohabiting couples
are also allowed to jointly file their tax return, provided they have lived together
for more than six months. Third, taxes can be filed digitally (computer-assisted)
or on paper. The share of digital filers has increased dramatically from about 30
percent in 2003 to almost 95 percent in 2015. Digital filing of tax returns is not
only helpful when deducting certain personal expenditures, but also facilitates
the optimal shifting of income. The exact threshold becomes more salient and
enables people to locate at the threshold more precisely.
In sum, the Dutch tax system can induce bunching behaviour because of a
combination of three things: 1) partners can move deductions between them and
19The tax thresholds in the Netherlands are known before the start of each fiscal year, as
these are published together with the governmental budget which is presented each year, on
the third Tuesday of September (Prinsjesdag).
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this is most attractive in the highest income tax bracket; 2) mortgage interest
deductions are quite large; 3) the digital filing of tax returns clearly reveals tax
thresholds as well as the related benefits of shifting certain deductions. As is
shown below, these specific features of the Dutch tax system result in sharp
bunching.
2.4 Data
The data used in this study is the Income Panel Data (IPO) provided by Stat-
istics Netherlands. This longitudinal data set covers the period from 2001 to
2014. It contains administrative data on all possible sources of income, on an
individual level, as well as a very detailed account of possible deductions from
the tax base. The panel is updated with new information on marital status
and include other, randomly selected individuals in every period to account for
people who are no longer observable. Most importantly for this study, Statistics
Netherlands provides the information on relevant taxable income for Box 1 (see
Table 2.2). The taxable income variable is obtained from the tax department,
representing the exact taxable income per individual. This circumvents the
problem of measurement error, which is vital for analyses that use the bunching
method. As our income measure includes all tax deductions, we do not have to
rely on tax simulators that are used in other studies (Gruber and Saez, 2002;
Chetty et al., 2011) to determine the tax liabilities, thus mitigating bias that
could stem from this exercise.
In addition to the information on taxable income and deductions, the dataset
also includes demographic characteristics, which we exploit to study heterogen-
eity in the bunching behaviour of different socio-economic groups. We provide
separate estimates for self-employed individuals, who theoretically would be
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more prone to bunching because of the lower costs and greater possibilities of
adjusting their taxable income. Furthermore, we distinguish people according
to gender and filing status. Our estimation sample is restricted as follows: We
exclude students as well as all people receiving governmental benefit payments,
as most of them receive similar amounts, thus creating an artificial mass point.
Because the tax is different for individuals aged 65 and over, we also exclude
them from our estimation, as well as those below the age of 18. We omit the
years 2001 and 2002 to avoid the inclusion of any after effects of the 2001 major
Dutch tax reform.20 Furthermore, we only retain individuals with a positive
reported taxable income. The pooled sample consists of N = 1, 219, 572 indi-
viduals, which is roughly 1% of the Dutch population per year. The sample
is evenly balanced with respect to gender (55% male) and married individuals
(65%). Furthermore, the sample contains 14% self-employed individuals, includ-
ing CEO’s, who would be in a position to decide on their own salary and are
able to adjust it.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Bunching Evidence
Figure 2.3 gives a first glance at the bunching behaviour. It displays the income
distribution for the most recent year of our sample where the data is collapsed
into income bins of 200 euros. The income thresholds of 2014 are indicated
by vertical lines. Clear bunching behaviour can be seen at the first and third
threshold. Note that there is no change in the marginal tax rate at the second
threshold in 2014 and so there should be no incentive to adjust taxable income.
20The tax reform substantially changed the thresholds and marginal tax rates and intro-
duced the system of income boxes.
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Figure 2.3: Income Distribution in 2014
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Notes: This figure shows the sample distribution of income below 80,000 e in the
Netherlands for 2014. The data is collapsed into 200-euro bins. The vertical lines
represent the first, second and third threshold of the Dutch tax system respectively.
We start out with the upper threshold, where the change in the marginal
tax rate is largest with 10 percentage-points (23.81%). here, the incentive to
bunch is most pronounced. Figure 2.4 reports the results for our pooled sample
from 2003 to 2014 showing the number of observations per bin, relative to the
threshold value. For the pooled years, our method to endogenously determine
the bunching window provides an asymmetric bunching window ranging from
-483 to +207 euros. We implement a 95% confidence interval for determining
the bunching window throughout this study.21 In addition, the BIC criterion
suggests a 7th order polynomial counterfactual model for the upper threshold. In
order to calculate an elasticity according to Equation (2.2), a weighted average
threshold value is used (54, 163 euros). The weights are constructed by the
21We also tested a smaller confidence level, i.e. a one-standard deviation increase, which
corresponds to a 68% confidence interval. The results are slightly larger but less precisely
estimated.
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number of taxpayers within the bunching window in each year. Standard errors
are calculated using bootstrapping techniques.
Figure 2.4: Bunching at the Third Threshold - Pooled Sample
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Notes: In this figure, bin counts are plotted relative to the third threshold for
the pooled sample from 2003 to 2014. The bunching window is between -483 and
+207 euros and the counterfactual model is a 7th order polynomial.
We observe sharp bunching at the third threshold and estimate an excess
mass of b = 1.67, which corresponds to 1.67 times more individuals being at the
threshold than would have been in the absence of any change in the marginal
tax rate. The estimated excess mass translates into an ETI of 0.023, which
is statistically significant at all usual significance levels. Quantitatively, a 10%
decrease in the net-of-tax rate would induce a 0.23% reduction in taxable income.
From an economic point of view, the tax response at this threshold is small, but
is in line with the findings of the bunching literature for similar tax increases.
We compare our data-driven procedure to determine the bunching window
with the estimates of using two different, symmetric bunching windows, to as-
sess whether our procedure provides an improvement. Figure 2.B.3 reports the
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results using a large bunching window from −750 euro to +750 euro and a small
bunching window from −350 euro to +350 euro. Compared to Figure 2.4, both
the large as well a the small window delivers smaller ETIs combined with larger
standard errors.
Finally, we estimate the excess mass for taxpayers and the ETI at the third
threshold for all years separately. This eases any concerns about using a weighted
average threshold in the pooled sample and hedges against possible bias stem-
ming from observing individuals multiple times. The results are provided in
the Appendix (Figures 2.B.5 to 2.B.16). One striking observation is that the
bunching behaviour of individuals is increasing and becoming more precise over
time. We ascribe this to learning effects, as taxpayers became more familiar
with the tax system that fundamentally changed in 2001. For the year 2003 we
still observe delayed effects from the major tax reform of 2001 and, therefore,
the bunching behaviour is fuzzy and small. It then increases in the subsequent
years until the elasticity reaches a level of around 0.025. Another explanation
for this increase in the amount and precision of bunching could be the emer-
gence of digital filing of tax returns, which made the threshold more salient to
the general public.
A case could be made for bunching at the other thresholds of the Dutch tax
system as well, albeit that the change in the net-of-tax rate is much smaller and
therefore, we would expect less reaction. Figure 2.5 shows the results for the
pooled sample for the first and second threshold, respectively. Surprisingly, we
observe clear bunching behaviour of individuals at both thresholds.
At the first threshold, the income levels are quite low, which might suggest
that individuals are more dependent on their income and should therefore show
little real responses to a change in the marginal tax rate. However, the estimate
for the ETI is about four times higher when compared to the third threshold
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Figure 2.5: Bunching at the First and Second Threshold - Pooled Sample
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Notes: The figures show bunching at the first and second thresholds for the pooled sample from
2003 to 2014. The bunching window is between -297.5 and +2422.5 euros for the first threshold
and between -782 and +690 euros for the second threshold. The counterfactual model is a 3rd
order polynomial in both cases.
(eth1 = 0.086 vs. eth3 = 0.023). Note that exact estimates for the ETI at both
thresholds cannot be depicted, because we have changing tax differences over
time, in addition to the changing threshold values. To calculate the ETI for these
two thresholds, we used a weighted average tax change on top of the weighted
average threshold. However, taking the average of the single-year ETI estimates
as a sensitivity check delivers similar results: an elasticity of 0.085 at the first
threshold. Contrary to our hypothesis, individuals with an income around the
lower threshold seem to be more engaged in all kinds of tax-optimizing behaviour
in order to relocate at the threshold. In addition, the bunching behaviour is less
precise and there is slightly more mass to the right of the threshold suggesting
that individuals are either less informed or less able to accurately adjust their
income.
From an economic perspective, the second thresholds might be of special
interest for two reasons. First, the total change in the net-of-tax rate (tax rate
plus social security contributions) is comparably small, with 3.35 percentage
points as a maximum in 2003. The gain of manipulating taxable income thus
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may not be larger than potential adjustment costs, which would lead to less
bunching. Second, the jump in marginal tax rates vanished in some years due
to the adjustments of the tax rate in tax bracket 2.22 Especially in these years,
there is no incentive to bunch at the respective threshold. Despite these small
incentives, the right graph of Figure 2.5 clearly shows that there is bunching
behaviour at the second threshold. For the pooled sample, the estimated ETI
amounts to 0.212 and is much higher compared to the other thresholds. This
can be partly attributed to the small tax changes (frequently below 1 percentage
point) that are used to derive the ETI. As expected, the result is largely driven
by early periods of the sample, where the jump in the marginal tax rate was
still noticeable. Also, there is no bunching evidence in the years where the
change in marginal tax rates is exactly zero. Figure 2.B.4 shows, for example,
the results for the years 2008 and 2009, with 2009 being the first year where
there was no jump at the second threshold. In 2008, we could still observe a
small excess mass of 0.29, but in 2009, where the incentive to adjust taxable
income vanished, we estimate a negative excess mass of merely -0.04, which is
statistically insignificant.23 For the year 2010, we are again able to identify a
small excess mass of 0.18, which is significant at the 5-per-cent level. We believe
that in accordance to the overestimation of small probabilities known from the
behavioural economics literature (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), individuals
overestimate benefits from small changes in the net-of-tax rate and subsequently
adjust their taxable income even though the economic gain is minimal.
Comparing the estimates from the first, second and third threshold, we con-
clude that the behavioural responses to taxation are heterogeneous and depend
on the location of taxable income within the income distribution. This is an
22This phenomenon occurred in 2009, 2013 and 2014, respectively.
23Note that because the tax change is zero in 2009, we cannot compute a value for the ETI
and therefore argue via the excess mass.
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aspect that deserves a more thorough discussion in the future, although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to shed further light on this matter.
2.5.2 Subgroup Analysis
To analyse if our results are driven by sub-groups, we split the sample according
to gender, employment status and filing status. The bunching literature has
shown that women tend to react more sensitive than men to changes in the net-
of-tax rate. To investigate this in our setting, we split the sample according to
gender and rerun the analyses for all thresholds. The results are shown in Figures
2.B.17, 2.B.18 and 2.B.19. At all thresholds, the ETI is larger for women than for
men, although the difference at the first threshold is relatively small. Here, the
number of women exceeds the number of men at the threshold, but at the second
and especially the third threshold, the number of men is substantially higher
than the number of women. This indicates that the ETI at the third threshold
in the pooled sample is predominantly driven by males. Given that there are
roughly three times as many men than women around the third threshold, the
ETI here in the pooled sample can also be described by the weighted sum of the
elasticities of men and women, i.e. (3 · emen + ewomen)/4 = 0.023.
We then split the sample by employment status. Self-employed individuals
have better possibilities to adjust their taxable income and are therefore more
prone to bunching. The results, shown in Figures 2.B.20, 2.B.21 and 2.B.22,
confirm this hypothesis for all thresholds. At the upper threshold, the ETI for
self-employed is 0.042, which is about twice the size of the estimate in the full
sample. In contrast to findings in many other studies, we also find a significant
elasticity for wage earners (e = 0.017); therefore the baseline result is not purely
driven by self-employed individuals and a similar weighting exercise as before
can be implemented here to obtain the ETI of the full sample.
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One explanation for the significant bunching behaviour of employed indi-
viduals could be that of trade unions jointly setting wage levels for groups of
individuals. Collective wage bargaining is very common in the Netherlands.
Both agreements at national level and industry or company-wide agreements
are made. First, at the national level, representatives of employers and employ-
ees advice on wage mutations. Then, negotiations take place at the industry-
level where this advice is taken into account. Specific for the Dutch wage set-
ting is that these agreements are extended by Law to non-unionized employees
within a firm and to all employers in that industry by the Minister of Em-
ployment and Social Affairs. In addition to company-wide agreements, many
large-scale companies have their own agreements and as such are not subject to
the industry-wide agreements. Even though union membership is declining in
the Netherlands as in other countries, the extension prevents the coverage rate
from falling. The observed bunching for wage earners might also be an indication
of collusion between employers and employees and of contracts being specifically
designed to achieve a taxable income at the threshold (Chetty et al., 2011). In
the Netherlands, employers and employees have the possibility to decide upon
wage changes at the individual level. However, the degree of flexibility depends
on the wage system. A majority of Dutch employees’ wage payments are based
on an industry-wide or company-wide wage schedule that resembles a staircase
with fixed starting salaries and upper ceilings and fixed wage increments for each
step in between (Deelen and Euwals, 2014). On top of this general increases,
employees and employers can decide on performance-related pay, which are at
the heart of the individual wage differences.
Finally, we split the sample by filing status. Although the Dutch tax system
is rather individualised, cohabiting people (married or unmarried) can file a tax
return jointly and are then known as fiscal partners. Fiscal partners have the
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Figure 2.6: Subsamples by Filing Status - Threshold 1
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by filing status for the first threshold. Single filers
are defined as having no possibility to file a tax return with another individual. Joint filers are
those individuals that have the possibility to file taxes together with a fiscal partner.
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Figure 2.7: Subsamples by Filing Status - Threshold 2
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by filing status for the second threshold. Single filers
are defined as having no possibility to file a tax return with another individual. Joint filers are
those individuals that have the possibility to file taxes together with a fiscal partner. Given the
small number of single filers, a smaller scale had to be used.
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Figure 2.8: Subsamples by Filing Status - Threshold 3
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by filing status for the third threshold. Single filers
are defined as having no possibility to file a tax return with another individual. Joint filers are
those individuals that have the possibility to file taxes together with a fiscal partner. Given the
small number of single filers, a smaller scale had to be used.
43
2.5. RESULTS
possibility to shift deductions between them, an option that is not available to
single filers. If individuals exploit the shifting of deductions as a main channel
to adjust taxable income, we would expect to see no spike for single filers, whilst
the estimates of the ETI for the joint filers should be close to the estimates from
the pooled sample. The results shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 support this
hypothesis. We can see no bunching behaviour of single filers at any threshold,
whilst for individuals that have the possibility to jointly file their tax returns,
we clearly see bunching behaviour. The elasticity estimates are also similar to
the estimates from the full sample, at the first threshold 0.097 compared to
0.086 and at the third threshold, the ETI is 0.026 compared to 0.023 in the
full sample. At the second threshold, the deviation is more substantial (0.143
compared to 0.212), which could be driven by the relatively large number of
single filers located around the second threshold. The results indicate that the
shifting of deductions plays a crucial role in adjusting taxable income and this
relationship is examined more thoroughly in the following subsection.
2.5.3 Anatomy of Response
The channels through which individuals bunch at the thresholds in a tax system
are manifold. A recent study by Doerrenberg et al. (2017) shows the importance
of tax deductions for welfare analyses with the ETI. As pointed out by Slemrod
(1996), one way to reveal the channel that drives bunching is to look at the
“anatomy of the behavioural response” (Saez et al., 2012). Due to the high
presence of mortgage interest deductions in the Netherlands, it is interesting
to examine this special kind of deduction, which can only be claimed for one,
usually the main mortgage. In total, mortgage interest deductions are by far
the biggest deduction claimed in the Netherlands with 9.9 billion e in 2015,
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as reported by the Ministry of Finance.24 It can be claimed by single filers as
well as by joint filers. We analyse the anatomy of response of wage earners for
2011 for which year we have additional information on the shifting behaviour.
Interestingly, almost 88% of all wage-earners in the vicinity of the third threshold
claim mortgage interest deductions. A much smaller fraction is partly self-
employed and a few individuals claim other expenditures such as for health
expenditures or charity donations. We are unable to identify the source of
bunching for about 5% of all wage-earners within the bunching window. Their
bunching response could be driven by a real response, such as a reduction in
working hours.
As shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, only joint filers engage in bunching
behaviour and therefore, we examine the mortgage interest deductions claimed
by joint filers. Because of the progressive tax system, shifting the full deduction
to the highest earning partner will reduce tax liabilities the most. However, the
actual incentive depends on the distance of taxable income to the threshold.
In cases where the higher earning partner claims the deduction to reduce his
taxable income but, in doing so, will cross the threshold, he has two options
once his income level reaches that threshold: He can then either deduct the
rest of the amount at a lower marginal tax rate, or he can shift the remaining
deduction to his partner. If his partner’s income is taxed at a lower marginal tax
rate, then the fiscal partners have no incentive to shift any of the deductions. If,
however, his partner now faces a higher marginal tax rate, the remaining part
of the tax deduction should be shifted. This last case, where individuals around
the thresholds do not utilise the full amount of mortgage interest deduction, will
result in sharp, “negative” bunching at the third threshold.
The sharp shifting is visible in Figure 2.9. The graphs show the share of
24This compromises the mortgage interest deduction and taxed fictional income from hous-
ing.
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Figure 2.9: Share Mortgage Interest Deductions
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Notes: The top figures show the share of mortgage interest deduction claimed by one partner
within couples around the first threshold (left) and the second threshold (right). The bot-
tom figure shows the share of mortgage interest deductions within couples around the third
threshold. The binsize is 200 euro.
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total mortgage interest deduction claimed by one partner within a couple. For
high-earners around the third threshold, the average share is around 80% of
total mortgage interest deduction of the couple. The higher the income, the
higher the share of the mortgage interest deduction claimed by the high-earning
partner, which is in line with the common expectation that the tax advantage is
higher for the highest earner. This can be seen by the jump in the share at the
first threshold, where the share of mortgage interest deduction claimed by an
individual below the threshold is between 20-25% and above between 35-40%. At
the second threshold, where the tax change is minimal, no clear jump in the share
is visible, but in line with the expected behaviour in the absence of a threshold,
we see a gradual increase in the share. Following this line of argumentation, we
would expect to see another jump at the third threshold, but we find a sharp
dip in the share of mortgage interest deduction claimed by an individual at the
upper threshold. This suggests that individuals strategically shift the mortgage
interest deduction to their partners, as soon as they have located their taxable
incomes at the threshold. Especially if both fiscal partners earn more than the
third threshold, this splitting of the mortgage interest deduction reduces the
overall tax burden of the fiscal partners. In summary, the graphs show that the
mortgage interest deductions combined with the opportunity to file jointly are
an important channel for reducing taxable income to reach thresholds of the tax
system, especially at the third threshold.
A second possible channel is that of the real response, for example in hours
worked. Due to the structure of our data, identification of these type of responses
in hours could only be done indirectly, for example, via hourly wages. We
do, unfortunately, not observe actual working hours. As bunchers come from
above the threshold and hourly wage can be assumed to increase with taxable
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income25, an individual that bunches should have a higher hourly wage than
other individuals that obtain a similar taxable income. However, looking at
data from 2006 to 2011, we cannot detect any significant difference between
bunchers and non-bunchers left or right of the bunching window in terms of
hourly wages, suggesting that real responses do not play a significant role in
adjusting taxable income.
2.5.4 Relation to the literature
Our results relate to the literature in several ways, although cross-country com-
parisons of elasticities might be difficult due to different institutional features
(Bastani and Selin, 2014). In line with other studies that implement the bunch-
ing approach, we find small but precise estimates of the compensated ETI with
respect to the net-of-tax rate at the top tax threshold of 0.023. Chetty et al.
(2011) find an elasticity at the upper threshold below 0.02 for their full sample
on Denmark, while Bastani and Selin (2014) find close-to-zero elasticities on
Sweden at the top tax threshold. Evidence on the United States, published by
Saez (2010), indicates an elasticity of between 0.1 and 0.2, depending on the
methodology, at the first threshold of the federal income tax schedule. He finds
a smaller response for married individuals than for singles. This is in stark con-
trast to our findings indicating significant bunching by cohabiting individuals in
the Netherlands, even at the first threshold of the tax system.
One structural difference that may explain this deviation between the United
States and the Netherlands is the social acceptance and federal legitimation of
part-time work. Employees in the Netherlands are arguably more free to choose
their working hours than workers in other countries because of the existence
25This can be justified for example by the higher skill level that high earners have compared
to low earners.
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of the Dutch Working Hours (Adjustment) Act. They can file a request for
amendment (increase or reduction) of their working hours that the employer
cannot refuse. In the United States, only 19% of the working population was
working part-time in 2013, whereas in the Netherlands this figure was almost
twice as high, with 36%. The significantly larger proportion of women bunching
can also be explained by this. In the United States, 26% of the female workforce
worked part-time, whereas in the Netherlands, this was 58% and these women
would likely earn an income close to the first threshold.26 This could be a
reason for the differences in the results. Alternative explanations are differences
in other institutional features, such as the possibility to shift tax deductions
between partners and the presence of digital filing of tax returns.
Earlier studies for the Netherlands find larger elasticities. Jongen and Stoel
(2013) find an elasticity of around 0.1 for the short run and 0.2 for the medium
run, with larger elasticities for women. The aforementioned study employs a
panel approach and uses instrumental variable techniques to correct for endo-
genous taxes in line with Gruber and Saez (2002). In contrast to our study,
they had to rely on a tax simulator to obtain marginal tax rates and determine
taxable income. This can potentially cause measurement error, which could ex-
plain some of the deviation between the results. Another explanation would be
that the bunching approach identifies a local elasticity as opposed to an average
elasticity derived from the IV approach (Chetty, 2012).
A recent study by Bettendorf et al. (2016) for managing directors that own
at least 5% of a corporation27 finds elasticities between 0.06 and 0.11 for the
upper threshold of the Dutch tax schedule, using bunching techniques. This
is slightly larger than the elasticity of 0.04 that we identify for self-employed
26Shares are calculated from the OECD Statistics database, where the labour force is meas-
ured by national criteria.
27These so-called DGAs (Directeur-Grootaandeelhouder) face a special tax scheme. In our
study, this sub-group belongs to that of the self-employed.
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individuals, and could suggest that our results are partly driven by the DGA
sub-group. Unfortunately, the limited number of DGAs in our sample prevents
us from running the estimation separately for this group.
In previous bunching studies, a distinction is made between real response
and income shifting. In a study on the self-employed in Denmark, Le Maire
and Schjerning (2013) show that about 50% to 70% of the bunching in taxable
income is due to income shifting over time. In a similar study for business
owners in Finland, Harju and Matikka (2016) attribute two thirds of the ETI
to income shifting between tax bases. However, we find that a large share of
bunching is driven by tax deductions in combination with shifting them between
partners. The presence of deduction possibilities confounds welfare analyses
using the ETI (Doerrenberg et al., 2017). Our results confirm the significance of
deduction possibilities for optimising taxable income. This finding also mirrors
earlier findings on itemised deductions (Saez, 2010).
Furthermore, our results show little evidence of collusion between employers
and employees. As final income taxes are based on taxable income and not on
broad income on the payslip, it is harder for employers and employees to determ-
ine the exact taxable income. The same holds for the response in hours worked.
Although, compared to employees in other countries, those in the Netherlands
can more easily adjust the number of hours they work, adjusting the number of
hours in such a way that the income stays below a certain taxation threshold is
very difficult. This requires an extensive knowledge on those thresholds and the
amount of all the deductions that turn labour income into taxable income in
Box 1. Nevertheless, responses in hours worked could play a role when analysing
self-employed, but due to a lack of data on the hours worked by self-employed,
we are unable to test this hypothesis. Our results indicate that the shifting
of deductions, particularly between partners, is the key channel of bunching
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behaviour in the Netherlands.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We implemented a purely data-driven procedure to find an optimal, poten-
tially asymmetric bunching window. Applying this extension to our data, we
found elasticities that are quantitatively similar, yet more precisely estimated
than elasticities estimated with the traditional approach. Our modification thus
forms a valuable contribution to the literature, as it allows for a more precise
calculation of the excess mass around the kink and the subsequent estimation
of the ETI.
We have estimated the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-
of-tax rate in the Netherlands. Using a unique tax data set on indiviudals from
Statistics Netherlands, containing exact taxable incomes, we exploited bunching
behaviour at kink points in the Dutch tax schedule to identify the ETI. We
found an elasticity of 0.023 in the full sample at the upper threshold of the tax
system, where the tax change is largest. Women respond more to taxation and
our analyses suggest that their response is mainly driven by working in part-
time employment. Self employed individuals also respond more, which is in line
with better (legal and illegal) adjustment opportunities. Unlike Chetty et al.
(2011) and Bastani and Selin (2014), we find a statistically significant ETI for
wage earners in the Netherlands at some parts of the income distribution.
Explorations into the anatomy of responses by wage earners revealed that
bunching is caused by shifting tax deductions, especially the mortgage interest
deduction, between joint filers. The shifting is facilitated by the digital filing of
tax returns, which makes the thresholds more salient to the general public. Our
results thus corroborate earlier studies claiming that the ETI is not a structural
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parameter but rather depends on institutional settings.
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2.A Derivation of the Bunching Estimator
For illustration, assume that each individual has the following utility function
u(c, z) with uc > 0, uz < 0,
where c = (1 − τ1)z is after-tax income used for consumption, z is before-
tax income and τ1 gives the marginal tax rate in the pre-reform period. Now,
the marginal tax rate changes from τ1 to τ2 with τ1 < τ2 at a specific earnings
level k so that all individuals with z > k face a higher marginal tax rate.28
Individuals earning an income less than k are not affected and therefore do not
react at all. Those with z > k + dz will reduce their taxable income, but they
will not exactly bunch at k in response to the reform (see Saez (2010) for a
more detailed illustration here). For all taxpayers between k and an income
level k+dz though, it is no longer optimal to supply the given amount of labour
and they re-optimise their income to k, i.e. they bunch at k. This situation is
depicted in Figure 2.A.1.
In the pre-reform period with a constant marginal tax rate τ1, individual
before-tax incomes z are smoothly distributed according to a smooth density
distribution h0(z). Bunching behaviour induces a spike in the post-reform in-
come distribution h1(z) and the density above the interval (k,k + dz] shifts to
k. Because of optimisation errors and imperfect control over taxable income,
we are more likely to observe a mass around the threshold, rather than a sharp
spike. This is depicted in Figure 2.A.2.
To derive the compensated elasticity of taxable income, we can use that for
small tax changes, the mass of taxpayers bunching is given by:
28To abstract from any income effects, the utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear.
However, simulations by Bastani and Selin (2014) show no economically significant bias of
income effects on compensated elasticities, which would make it superfluous to assume such
a utility function.
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Figure 2.A.1: Utility under a Kinked Tax Schedule
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Figure 2.A.2: Imperfect Bunching
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B =
∫ k+dz
k
h0(z) dz ≈ h0(z) dz, (2.10)
where the approximation follows from the mean value theorem for integra-
tion. Substituting dz = B
h0(z)
from (2.10) into the elasticity formula given by
e(z) =
dz
z
d(1−τ)
(1−τ)
(2.11)
at z = k leads to
e(k) =
B(dz)
k · h0(z) · log(1−τ11−τ2 )
. (2.12)
Thus, the elasticity of taxable income is non-parametrically identified by
expression (2.12) if and only if the derivative h0(z) with respect to z is continuous
in z ∀ z, which means there should be no peak in the pre-reform distribution
at the kink point. However, although the counterfactual pre-reform density is
not observable in reality, in most applications it seems reasonable to hold on to
that assumption if there are no obvious violations.29 Note, that the expression
in (2.12) shows that the elasticity parameter is proportional to the number of
taxpayers who bunch at the kink point k.
While k and log(1−τ1
1−τ2 ) from (2.12) are directly observable policy parameters,
the relative excess mass of taxpayers defined by b = B(dz)
h0(k)
has to be estimated.
We follow the estimation approach developed in Chetty et al. (2011) and es-
timate the counterfactual density h0(k) – the density in absence of any kink
– directly by local polynomial regression. However, for plausible reasons, the
29Besides, there exist some smoothness checks depending on the respective setting. Le Maire
and Schjerning (2013) propose to exploit shifting of kinks over time to examine the smoothness
of the density at the respective threshold in the after-shift period. Moreover, it seems plausible
to assume smoothness if the distribution to the left and right of the bunching window does
not show any jumps. Nevertheless, the assumption cannot be tested directly.
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empirical post-reform distribution will not have a single spike at z = k even
if there is behavioural reaction in response to a tax change in the population.
Therefore, the theoretical spike at k will become an empirical bunching window
around k (”imperfect bunching”). Some of the reasons for imperfect bunching
are uncertainty in income due to random income components (income volatil-
ity) or the inability to perfectly adjust labour supply in case of contracted hours
constraints from the employer (Chetty et al., 2011).
Additionally, to account for changing thresholds over time when using tax-
able income from several years, we need to re-centre the income variable by
calculating the difference between taxable income and the respective threshold
before pooling the data. Individuals are then grouped into bins of length δ, with
Zj being the midpoint of the distance interval. Thus, Zj is the absolute distance
between income bin j and the threshold k where k differs over years (e.g., due
to inflation adjustments). To estimate the counterfactual distribution, Chetty
et al. (2011) propose a two-step procedure using a local polynomial regression
while excluding all observations within the bunching window [l;u]:
N˜j =
q∑
i=0
βi · Zi +
u∑
i=l
γi · I[Zj = i] + εj (2.13)
with Nj denoting the number of individuals in income bin j and q denoting
the order of the polynomial. I is an indicator function equal to one if the bin
point lies within the bunching window. εj denotes the error of the polynomial
regression. An initial simple estimate of the number of bunching individuals is
B˜ =
∑u
l (Nj − N˜j). However, this estimate would overestimate the excess mass
as the integration constraint is not satisfied. The area under the counterfactual
density would not sum to one as the observations within the bunching window
(with an expected higher density) are left out from the regression. Therefore, the
counterfactual density has to be shifted to the upper right for those observations
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that lie to the right of the bunching threshold. Bˆ is thus equally distributed on
the total right tail of the income distribution following
Nˆj(1 + I[j > u]
B˜∑∞
u+1Nj
) =
q∑
i=0
βi · Zi +
u∑
i=l
γi · I[Zj = i] + εj. (2.14)
To get the relative excess mass bˆ, the estimated bunching mass has to be
related to the (average) height of the counterfactual density at the kink in the
following way
bˆ =
Bˆ∑u
l Nˆj
u−l+1
. (2.15)
Along with the policy parameters k, expressed in terms of the binwidth
(Bastani and Selin, 2014), and log(1−τ1
1−τ2 ), the compensated elasticity of taxable
income with respect to the net-of-tax-rate can be estimated by inserting all
values into (2.12). With regard to the calculation of standard errors, we decided
to use a parametric residual bootstrap for our analysis.
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2.B Additional Graphs and Tables
Figure 2.B.1: Sample Income Distribution for Monte-Carlo Simulation
0
.0
00
01
.0
00
02
.0
00
03
.0
00
04
D
en
si
ty
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
Taxable Income
Notes: The figure shows the income distribution used in the Monte-Carlo simulations. The analysed
thresholds at 10,000, 20,000 and 40,000 Euros are depicted by the vertical lines. The distribution is
cut off at 80,000 Euros, which is roughly the 99th percentile of the simulated income distribution.
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Table 2.B.1: Development of Thresholds
First Threshold Second Threshold Third Threshold
2001 14,870 27,009 46,309
2002 15,331 27,847 47,746
2003 15,883 28,850 49,464
2004 16,265 29,543 50,652
2005 16,893 30,357 51,762
2006 17,046 30,631 52,228
2007 17,319 31,122 53,064
2008 17,579 31,589 53,860
2009 17,878 32,127 54,776
2010 18,218 32,738 54,367
2011 18,628 33,436 55,694
2012 18,945 33,863 56,491
2013 19,645 33,363 55,991
2014 19,645 33,363 56,531
Notes: The table reports the development of the thresholds of the Dutch
tax system from 2001 to 2014.
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Figure 2.B.2: Development of Marginal Tax Rates
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Notes: The figure depicts the development of the marginal tax rates in the Netherlands from 2001
to 2014.
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Figure 2.B.3: Bunching at the Third Threshold - Large and Small Windows
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Notes: The figures show bunching at the third threshold using two alternative, symmetric bunching
windows. The left graph shows the results using a large window and the right graph show the
respective results for the small window.
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Figure 2.B.4: Bunching at the Second Threshold - 2008 and 2009
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Notes: The figures show (non-)bunching behaviour at the second threshold of the Dutch tax
system for the years 2008 and 2009. Because the tax change was zero in 2009 and it is part of the
denominator in the elasticity formula, no value for the ETI can be estimated in 2009.
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Figure 2.B.5: Single Year Estimates 2003
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2003
Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2003.
Figure 2.B.6: Single Year Estimates 2004
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-5000 0 5000
Distance Third Threshold
b: 0.5609      b_se: 0.1258      e: 0.0207      q: 1      binwidth: 353
2004
Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2004.
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Figure 2.B.7: Single Year Estimates 2005
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2005.
Figure 2.B.8: Single Year Estimates 2006
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2006.
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Figure 2.B.9: Single Year Estimates 2007
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2007
Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2007.
Figure 2.B.10: Single Year Estimates 2008
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2008.
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Figure 2.B.11: Single Year Estimates 2009
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2009.
Figure 2.B.12: Single Year Estimates 2010
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2010.
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Figure 2.B.13: Single Year Estimates 2011
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2011.
Figure 2.B.14: Single Year Estimates 2012
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2012.
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Figure 2.B.15: Single Year Estimates 2013
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Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2013.
Figure 2.B.16: Single Year Estimates 2014
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2014
Notes: The figure shows the bunching behaviour at the third threshold of the Dutch tax system
for the year 2014.
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Figure 2.B.17: Subsamples by Gender - Threshold 1
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by gender at the first threshold. The upper graph
shows men, the lower graph shows women.
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Figure 2.B.18: Subsamples by Gender - Threshold 2
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by gender at the second threshold. The upper graph
shows men, the lower graph shows women.
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Figure 2.B.19: Subsamples by Gender - Threshold 3
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by gender at the third threshold. The upper graph
shows men, the lower graph shows women.
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Figure 2.B.20: Subsamples by Employment Status - Threshold 1
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by employment status at the first threshold. The
upper graph shows wage earners, the lower graph shows self-employed individuals.
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Figure 2.B.21: Subsamples by Employment Status - Threshold 2
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by employment status at the second threshold. The
upper graph shows wage earners, the lower graph shows self-employed individuals.
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Figure 2.B.22: Subsamples by Employment Status - Threshold 3
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Notes: The figures show bunching behaviour by employment status at the third threshold. The
upper graph shows wage earners, the lower graph shows self-employed individuals.
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Chapter 2 showed how individuals react to changes in the marginal tax rate.
The estimated elasticities of taxable income were low, indicating that individuals
do not react excessively to increases in the MTR. This may be due to optim-
isation frictions, hours constraints or a lack of understanding of the tax system.
Especially for financially constrained individuals, costly tax optimisation is not
feasible and a combination of the aforementioned factors prevents large reac-
tions to increases in the MTR. Firms on the other hand are assumed to be less
constrained than individuals and more concerned with maximising shareholder
value, thus also more likely to engage in tax optimisation. This behaviour in-
tensifies with the size of the firm and is especially pronounced for MNEs that
have the possibility to utilise tax differences across countries. As described in
the introduction, the corporate tax rate of the countries within the EU varies
between 10% and 35% as well as the tax code, which creates significant incent-
ives to shift income between jurisdictions.
To show this, Chapter 3 investigates the introduction of transfer pricing
regulations (TPR) by analysing data on the value and quantity of exports. TPR
aim at stopping the misuse of transfer prices to minimise (maximise) taxable
income in high-tax (low-tax) jurisdictions. Prior to the introduction of TPR,
firms have an incentive to utilise the tax rate differentials that exist between
two countries. Because a distorted world is observed prior to the introduction
of TPR, I expect to find counterbalancing reactions to their introduction, i.e.
the overvaluation (undervaluation) of exports to high-tax (low-tax) jurisdictions
should be reduced. The pricing effect of TPR has been studied extensively in
previous research, but evidence on quantitative reactions that hint at allocative
inefficiencies is scarce. The chapter intends to tackle this problem and provide
a rationale for the effects that the quantitative responses might have for the
efficiency of the tax system.
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The Effect of Transfer Pricing
Regulations on Intra-Industry
Trade
3.1 Motivation
n October 2015, the OECD announced the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) action plan, which aims at taxing corporations at the location where
production takes place and preventing MNEs to internationally shift profits.
Multinational firms have several possibilities to shift profit to affiliates in low tax
countries. One of the predominant tax planning strategies is the manipulation
of intra-firm prices. Many countries have introduced transfer pricing regulations
to keep corporate profits within their borders. Overall, these laws attempt to tie
intra-firm prices to arm’s-length equivalents. The empirical literature has shown
that firms manipulate transfer prices for tax optimising purposes (Bartelsman
and Beetsma, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Clausing, 2003; Cristea and
Nguyen, 2013; Davies et al., 2015) and that they react sensitive to transfer
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pricing regulations (Lohse and Riedel, 2013). While the literature has provided
evidence for the manipulation of intra-firm transfer prices exploiting the pricing
mechanism, little is known about how trade volumes are affected.
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the quantity effects on trade
flows that transfer pricing regulations might have. Under the premise that intra-
firm prices did indeed deviate from their corresponding arm’s-length prices, we
assume that prices are adjusted towards the arm’s-length price when transfer
pricing regulations are introduced. Although this change in prices influences the
profits and therefore the tax bases of firms in the respective countries, which
on its own could lead to severe economic consequences, we argue that a change
in trade volume could amplify this effect. In other words, only considering
the pricing channel would lead to an underestimation of the effectiveness of
transfer pricing regulations. In the extreme case, if an affiliate was only held
for tax optimising purposes and intermediate goods were merely imported and
reexported, reoptimisation by the multinational would lead to the abandonment
of the affiliate in that country. An effect of transfer pricing regulations on traded
quantities also hints at allocative inefficiencies that are induced by taxation.
For a long time, the empirical literature on anti-avoidance strategies by-and-
large focusses on analysing one measure at a time. Broadly, three instruments
can be defined: Transfer pricing regulations (TPR), thin capitalisation rules
(TCR) and controlled foreign company (CFC) regulations. Among others, Lohse
and Riedel (2013), Zinn et al. (2014) and Beer and Loeprick (2015) focus on
TPR, Buettner et al. (2012), Merlo et al. (2015) and Mardan (2017) discuss
TCR and Voget (2011) as well as Buettner and Wamser (2013) analyse CFC
rules.
Only recently, the literature has started to analyse the interplay of different
anti-avoidance measures. For instance, the BEPS Action Plan 3 states in its final
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report that CFC rules somewhat complement transfer pricing regulations and
address the same income, but neither policy is able to fully substitute the other
(OECD, 2015). Therefore, considering both TPR as well as CFC rules could
lead to a different interpretation of the effectiveness of TPR. This is because
part of the effect attributed to the introduction of TPR could stem from the
effective CFC rules already in place. Schindler and Schjelderup (2013) provide
a theoretical framework for the interdependency of debt shifting and transfer
pricing strategies. Empirical evidence is limited to two studies that explicitly
address the interconnectivity of different profit shifting activities. Based on
firm-level data, Saunders-Scoot (2015) finds that the two most prominent profit
shifting channels of debt shifting and transfer pricing are substitutes. Nicolay
et al. (2016) provide evidence for Europe that substitution effects between both
channels exist but that TCR are ineffective in limiting profit shifting behavior
if strict TPR are missing. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
study examining whether anti-profit-shifting activities affect traded volumes.
We base our estimation strategy on the workhorse model of international
trade, the gravity model. First applied by Tinbergen in 1962, it shows that
trade between two countries can be explained by their relative force of grav-
ity, using GDP as the weight of the countries and distance between them as a
negative correction. Baltagi et al. (2003) develop a panel data gravity model
that we adopt here for the use of intermediate goods trade. Transfer pricing
regulations enter the model as one form of trade costs. We estimate the model
using UN COMTRADE data on bilateral exports of intermediate goods in the
car industry for the period 1995 until 2012. The car industry is characterised
by high specialisation and a low share of trade between unrelated third parties,
thus providing ample opportunities to manipulate transfer prices. The approach
taken in this paper allows us to analyse the effect at the level where the variation
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in regulations takes place. Because not all trade activities between countries can
be attributed to profit shifting behaviour, it is important to keep in mind that we
will not find results at the extensive margin of trade but rather at the intensive
margin.
Our main findings are as follows: Under the assumption that transfer prices
have been manipulated, the introduction of TPR reduce (increase) trade with
countries that have a lower (higher) tax rate than the exporting country. The
effect is driven by the size of the tax rate differential. We find evidence for
the interplay of different anti-avoidance measures, especially TPR and CFC.
In a back-of-the-envelope calculation utilising the value of trade, we can show
that the pricing reaction in our data is in line with the literature and that the
quantity effects found in our study amplify the reaction of firms to TPR.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We first describe our data
and derive our hypotheses, before explaining the estimation strategy. Section
3.5 presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.
3.2 Data
The data used in this study comes from the UN COMTRADE database as har-
monised by the CEPII in their BACI database. It provides bilateral trade data
at a disaggregated, 6-digit HS goods classification level. We observe all inter-
mediate goods, which enter the production for motorised vehicles weighing less
than 3.5t.1 Considering intermediate goods trade has an appealing advantage
over trade in final goods: It allows us to abstract from demand shocks that are
less pronounced compared to final goods. We focus on the car industry, which
relies on highly specialised intermediate goods and is characterised by frequent
1HS-codes ranging from 870600 to 870899.
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Table 3.1: Transfer Pricing Regulations
Country TP Regulations
Brazil 1997
Canada 1998
China 2008
France 1996
Germany 2003
India 2001
Italy 2010
Japan 1986
Mexico 1997
Russia –
South Korea 1996
Spain 2006
United Kingdom 1999
United States 1994
trade between related parties. Therefore, the manipulation of transfer prices is
relatively easier and we expect a significant reaction to transfer pricing regula-
tions. The data were merged with information on corporate tax rates coming
from Loretz (2008) as well as KPMG. Data on GDP and economic integration
were taken from the World Bank and the EIA Database respectively.
We hand collected data on introduction of transfer pricing regulations from
Deloitte (2015); Ernst&Young (2014); KPMG (2014) and PWC (2016). For
some countries, the publications offer different years of enactment of transfer
pricing regulations and we chose the most common. When several dates were
offered in one publication, we chose the point in time where mandatory docu-
mentation requirements came into place. Table 3.1 shows the years in which the
exporting countries in our sample introduced transfer pricing regulations.
We concentrate on data from 1995 until 2012, a period in which many coun-
tries introduced transfer pricing regulations, which gives us the variation for
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identification. We focus on the 14 most important exporting countries with
the largest car industries as measured by production in 1995 and assess their
trade with all other countries of the world. This gives us confidence that our
model captures a great share of worldwide intermediate goods trade in the car
industry.2 The BACI data provides us with information on actual trade flows,
but omits zero trade flows. For our analysis however, it is important to also
account for trade flows that did not take place, as these could potentially be
caused by the existence of transfer pricing regulations. Therefore we rectangu-
larise our data set so that we have observations for each exporter-importer-year
combination. All new observations are assigned a quantity and a value of zero,
assuming that if we do not observe a trade flow, there was none. In an exten-
sion, we could explore the possibility of misreporting by the exporting country
by analysing imports of the partner country, which we can use to verify our
procedure. We are left with a total of 153 importing countries for which we
have obtained all variables.
3.3 Hypotheses
To stress the quantity effect and why allocative distortions could exist, consider
a representative MNE active in the three countries A, B and C. To produce
the final good, only trade in intermediaries from A to B is required, but for
tax optimising purposes, intermediate goods are exported from A to C and
then from C to B. This situation can arise, whenever tax rate differences exist
between countries. Figure 3.1 shows such a situation. In order to minimise the
tax burden, the MNE would like profits to accrue in country C. This can be
2The 14 countries had a share in excess of 95% of total car production in
1995(https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_23.html_mfd. Last accessed
18.06.2017).
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Figure 3.1: Three Country Model with Tax Rate Differences
A20% B 25%
C
5%
Exports undervalued Exports overvalued
facilitated by undervaluing exports from A to C and overvaluing exports from
C to B.
Now suppose country A introduces transfer pricing regulations. Because C
has a lower tax rate, the exports from country A to country C are undervalued
to minimise profits in A and maximise profits in C. The regulations will force
companies in A to increase their prices, therefore again making the trade via C
relatively more expensive. This is the situation that is analysed in the empirical
application of this paper.3 This simple illustration shows that no matter which
country imposes transfer pricing regulations, there are incentives for firms to
alter the volumes traded between countries, given sufficiently high trade costs.
A priori, we would expect MNEs to utilise tax rate differences and therefore
export more to countries that have a lower tax rate than the home country.
This would indicate that we should see a negative coefficient for the tax rate
difference, when it is non-positive and a positive coefficient when the tax rate
difference is positive. The introduction of transfer pricing regulations should
3Transfer pricing regulations in B will require the company in B to pay an arm’s-length
price for the intermediate good imported from C. This will increase profits in B and decrease
profits in C, which also lowers the attractiveness of exporting via country C. Country C
benefits from the manipulation of transfer prices and therefore has no incentive to introduce
TPR.
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bring the effects closer together and we expect this to be strongly driven by the
size of the tax rate difference. This corresponds to a positive coefficient on the
interaction of tax rate difference and transfer pricing regulations for non-positive
tax rate differences and a negative effect for this interaction for importers with
a lower tax rate than the exporting country.
3.4 Estimation Strategy
The gravity model of trade was first introduced by Tinbergen (1962). It applies
Newton’s law of gravity from physics to economics and explains trade between
two countries as proportional to their economic size (GDP) and inversely propor-
tional to the distance between the two countries. Although the gravity model in
its simplest form is able to explain a substantial amount of trade already, several
extensions to the base model exist, most notably the introduction of trade costs
as a second deterring factor of trade and the inclusion of multilateral resistance
terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). In empirical applications, these are
controlled for by adding country fixed effects to the estimation.
We analyse the relationship between transfer pricing regulations and trade
flows using a gravity-type model of the following form:
Xijt = αl
λ
itm
µ
jtt
β
ijt, (3.1)
which follows Baltagi et al. (2014) and where Xijt denotes the exports (quantity
or value) from country i to country j at time t. Baltagi et al. (2014) define lit
and mjt as exporter-time-specific and importer-time-specific factors respectively.
tijt broadly reflects trade costs that can possibly vary across all dimensions and
λ, µ andβ are measures for the partial elasticity of trade flows with respect to
the respective parameters.
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To estimate the model, we impose a logarithmic transformation on Equation
(3.1) and follow Baltagi et al. (2014) in defining the following set-up for our
estimation equation:
ln(Xijt) = α + t
′
ijtβ + λlit + µmjt + uij + δt + εijt, (3.2)
where uij are country-pair fixed effects, δt represent time fixed effects and εijt
is an error term. To avoid endogeneity problems, it is important that the equa-
tion consists of some components that are exporter-time-specific and importer-
time-specific, i.e. lit and mjt from Equation (3.1) respectively. Baltagi et al.
(2003) propose a generalised model that accounts for this endogeneity by adding
exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects instead of the simple year fixed
effects in Equation (3.2). A drawback from this approach, however, is that it
does not allow to separately identify the effect of time-invariant variables. In our
application, the variable of interest - transfer pricing regulations - varies at the
exporter-year or importer-year level, that is it would drop from the estimation
due to collinearity. We account for exporter-time-specific and importer-time-
specific factors by including control variables that are either independent of
the i dimension, representing importer-year-specific factors, or the j dimension,
representing exporter-year-specific factors. Furthermore, trade costs are repres-
ented by the tax rates and a transfer pricing regulation dummy, as well as an
interaction term between the two. Our estimation equation thus takes on the
following form:
ln(Xijt) =α + β1 ln τit + β2 ln τjt + β3TPRit + β4 ln τit · TPRit+ (3.3)
EIAijt + λ lnGDPit + µ lnGDPjt + uij + δt + εijt,
where τit and τjt represent the statutory corporate tax rates in country i and j
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at time t, respectively, TPRit is a dummy indicating whether transfer pricing
regulations were in place in the exporting country at time t and EIAijt controls
for the strength of economic integration between i and j through a set of dum-
mies. GDPit and GDPjt are GDP in the exporting and importing country at
time t.4
A regression of Equation (3.3) using the full sample could be problematic,
because the incentives to shift profits (and possibly quantities) differ depending
on the sign of the tax rate difference between two trading partners. If a positive
tax rate difference exists, firms in country i will have an incentive to shift profits
to country j by manipulating the transfer price downwards, whilst in the case
that a negative tax rate difference exists, the transfer prices should be manip-
ulated upwards. Looking at both cases together could cancel out any effects of
transfer pricing regulations, as we expect opposite reactions depending on the
sign of the tax rate difference. We therefore split the sample into cases where
τi > τj (positive tax difference) and cases where τi < τj (negative tax difference)
and explicitly exclude the case where the tax rates are equal, as profit shifting
opportunities only arise, when a tax rate difference can be utilised.
When analysing worldwide trade, the number of country pair fixed effects to
be estimated increases rapidly. Also, log-linearisation of the model that is com-
mon in the literature could lead to biased estimates, for example through the
mishandling of zero trade flows. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator that incorporates the multilat-
eral resistance terms and circumvents the problems arising from log-linearising
the model. The results suggest some fundamental differences with parameters
estimated using the traditional fixed effects method on log-linearised data. For
4We do not include distance or other time-invariant country pair characteristics that are
familiar from earlier gravity models, because they are collinear to the country pair fixed effect
uij.
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example, the effect of GDP is not close to one but significantly lower and the
effect of geographical distance as well as colonial ties are greatly exaggerated in
the classical log-linearised model. We will therefore report results of estimating
a traditional fixed effects log-linear gravity model as well as a PPML model and
discuss potential differences between the models.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline Results
The baseline results of estimating Equation (3.3) are shown in Table 3.2. The
observational unit is a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to importing
country j. In total, we observe N = 26, 419 such pairs. In the first two columns,
we regress the logarithm of quantity only on the logarithm of the tax rates
in i and j as well as the control variables.5 Column (1) shows the results for
all country pairs, where the exporting country i has a higher tax rate than the
importing country j. The positive and significant coefficient on the own tax rate
indicates on the one hand that countries with higher tax rates tend to export
more and on the other hand also shows that ceteris paribus i.e. for a given tax
rate of the importing country, an increase in the exporting country’s tax rate
leads to more trade. From an economic point of view, this is a plausible result,
because as we are looking at the sample where τi > τj, any increase in τi will
ultimately increase the tax difference and therefore the incentive to shift profits.
The reverse is true for the case where we have a negative tax difference (τi < τj)
and this can be seen in column (2) with the positive coefficient for τj. The cross
5Throughout all estimations in this section, the coefficients for lnGDPi/j are positive and
significant, as suggested by economic theory. We cannot report estimates for other common
control variables in the trade literature such as distance, common language or contiguity,
because they are captured by the country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports
ln τi 1.472
∗∗∗ -0.618 1.770∗∗∗ -0.644 3.357∗∗∗ -0.750
(0.538) (1.836) (0.543) (1.825) (0.604) (1.809)
ln τj -0.365 3.215
∗∗ -0.380 3.190∗∗ -0.289 4.461∗∗
(0.478) (1.323) (0.474) (1.313) (0.459) (1.751)
TPRi 0.154
∗∗∗ 0.062 2.545∗∗∗ 0.871
(0.045) (0.085) (0.309) (0.604)
ln τi · TPRi -7.984∗∗∗
(1.009)
ln τj · TPRi -2.583
(1.826)
N 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119
R2 0.227 0.123 0.228 0.124 0.237 0.124
F − Test – – – – 0.000 0.035
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of Equation (3.3). Cluster-Robust standard errors
on the country-pair level are in parentheses. All estimations include the logarithm
of GDP for both countries, a set of dummies controlling for economic integration
and year fixed effects as control variables. Coefficients are omitted for brevity.
F-Test shows the p-value for a test of joint significance of the tax rate and the
interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
tax rates are both negative, which further enhances the effect of the tax rate
difference, but both coefficients are statistically not distinguishable from zero,
thus suggesting that trade flows depend more on the country with the higher
tax rate. The results furthermore show that trade flows differ in a world where
taxation exists from trade flows in a world without (distortive) taxation.
In columns (3) and (4), we introduce a dummy indicating whether TPR
were in place in country i at time t. In case of a positive tax rate difference,
transfer pricing regulations lead to a slight increase in trade. This seems puzzling
at first, because we would have assumed that more quantity was traded than
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optimally required, prior to the introduction of TPR and therefore, a reduction
of the traded quantities should be expected. However, the reduction should take
place especially with countries that have a substantially lower tax rate than the
exporting country and as trade with the very low tax rate importing countries
declines, trade with the importing countries that are close to the exporting
country in terms of the tax rate could increase. This suggests that the effect is
possibly driven by the tax rate and therefore in columns (5) and (6), we interact
the TPR dummy with the tax rate of the exporting country (5) and importing
country (6) respectively.
The reaction is indeed driven by the tax rate, as indicated by the statist-
ically significant negative coefficient on the interaction variable in column (5).
Moreover, we find that the positive effect of the tax rate on exported quantities
found in columns (1) and (3) was biased downward by country-pairs affected by
TPR. An increases in τi of one percent leads to an increase in exported quantit-
ies of 3.36 percent when no TPR are in place. Likewise, when TPR are in place,
an increase of one percent in τi leads to a decrease in traded quantities of 4.63
percent. When τi < τj though, TPR in country i do not seem to affect traded
quantities as shown in column (4). The interaction effect with the tax rate of
the importing country shows a slight decrease in the quantities traded when
TPR are in place: An increase in the profit shifting incentive of one percent is
associated with an increase in traded quantities of 1.88 percent as opposed to
4.46 percent without TPR, but in contrast to the case where τi > τj, the effect
remains positive. A test for joint significance reveals that τj and the interaction
term are jointly significant at the five percent level.
To account for the bilateral trade flows over time, we have relied on clustering
the data at the country-pair level. However, as the variation in our treatment
dummy comes from the exporting country side only, we ideally would like to use
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cluster-robust standard errors at the exporting country level. Due to the small
number of exporting countries in our sample, standard clustering techniques are
not suited and we employ randomisation inference in the spirit of Fisher (1935)
to calculate valid p-values. The idea behind this inference technique is based
on standard permutation methods: by reassigning treatment randomly across
clusters many times, one gets a self-made distribution under the null hypothesis
of no effect.6 This distribution is then used to calculate p-values. Note that in
our study, it is the sequence of the treatment dummy that has to be resampled
and not the treatment dummy alone to avoid unrealistic transfer pricing histories
where countries randomly seem to switch transfer pricing regulations on and off.
Using the specifications from columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.2, we ran 10,000
replications to construct a valid distribution of the t-values. From the results, we
cannot identify a robust effect for importing countries that exhibit a higher tax
rate than the exporting country, with the p-value for the interaction between the
tax rate and the transfer pricing regulations being 0.602. But for the opposite
case, we find a highly statistically significant (p = 0.005) reduction of the traded
quantities from the exporting countries to countries with a lower tax rate once
transfer pricing regulations are in place.
3.5.2 Interplay of Anti-Avoidance Measures
Some authors have argued that there could be an interplay of different anti-
avoidance measures. When analysing the effect of TPR on the firm level and
using operating profits as dependent variable, CFC rules and TCR should not
play a role, as they both affect financial profits (Lohse and Riedel, 2013). But
there is no reason to believe that these rules could not have an effect on traded
quantities and therefore, we investigate the relationship between traded quant-
6For a detailed description see Barrios et al. (2012); Ho and Imai (2006).
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Table 3.3: Interaction with other Anti-Avoidance Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports
ln τi 3.548
∗∗∗ -0.751 3.856∗∗∗ -1.584 3.635∗∗∗ 0.576
(0.608) (2.072) (0.613) (2.037) (0.594) (1.970)
ln τj -0.296 3.121
∗ -0.275 3.437∗∗ -0.290 3.653∗∗
(0.457) (1.662) (0.453) (1.635) (0.457) (1.660)
TPRi 2.573
∗∗∗ 0.168 3.069∗∗∗ 0.846 2.643∗∗∗ 0.628
(0.309) (0.566) (0.329) (0.576) (0.298) (0.556)
ln τi · TPRi -8.243∗∗∗ -8.900∗∗∗ -8.333∗∗∗
(1.010) (1.016) (0.990)
ln τj · TPRi -0.826 -1.205 -1.653
(1.737) (1.712) (1.712)
CFCi 0.163
∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.106) (0.070) (0.141) (0.072) (0.111)
TCRi -0.200
∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.150∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.048) (0.101) (0.048) (0.101) (0.065) (0.134)
TPRi · CFCi -0.398∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.131)
TPRi · TCRi -0.071 -0.346∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.125)
N 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119
R2 0.240 0.142 0.243 0.152 0.240 0.144
F − Test 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.072
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of Equation (3.3). Cluster-Robust standard errors on the
country-pair level are in parentheses. All estimations include the logarithm of GDP for
both countries, a set of dummies controlling for economic integration and year fixed effects
as control variables. Coefficients are omitted for brevity. F-Test shows the p-value for a
test of joint significance of the tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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ities and anti-avoidance measures more thoroughly in Table 3.3. In the first two
columns, we additionally control for CFC rules and TCR being in place in the
exporting country. When τi > τj, we find that both measures have an impact
on the exports from country i to country j, but the main result from Table 3.2
remains unchanged: a one percent increase in the tax rate now leads to a 4.69
percent decrease in traded quantities once TPR are in place opposed to 4.63
percent before. In the second column, however, CFC rules show a significant
influence also on the main results, as the effect of τj is smaller in the absence of
TPR and once TPR are introduced, a one percent increase in the τj leads to an
increase of 2.3 percent (compared to 1.88 percent before). In other words, CFC
rules, in cases where τi < τj, dampen the effects of TPR.
In order to further investigate the interplay of CFC and TPR, we include an
interaction of both dummies in a next step. The interaction effect is negative,
suggesting that if both TPR and CFC rules are in place, less quantity is traded
in column (3), which suggests that CFC rules enhance the effectiveness of TPR.
This is also evident from the absolute increase in the effect of the tax rate
conditional on TPR, which now indicates a reduction of 5.04 percent of exports
for a one percent increase in τi. Column (4) reports the results for cases where
the exporting county has a lower tax rate than the importing country. CFC rules
alone still exert a statistically significant positive effect on exports, but this effect
is smaller if TPR are in place, as shown by the negative interaction term. The
effect of τj and the TPR, CFC interaction term remain quantitatively similar
to the results from column (2), which shows that there is limited sensitivity to
the simultaneous presence of TPR and CFC rules if the importing country has
a higher tax rate than the exporting country.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) investigate the interplay between TPR and
TCR. Column (5) shows no additional effect of the interaction between TPR
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and TCR and the reaction to an increase of one percent in τi when facing
TPR is -4.7 percent, which is again close to the baseline effect from Table 3.2.
Although the interaction effect between TPR and TCR is statistically significant
in column (6), the magnitude of the effect is small. Also, the baseline effect of
the tax rate and the interaction with TPR remains similar in size (2 vs. 1.88
percent) compared to the results in Table 3.2. TCR therefore do not seem to
alter the effects that TPR alone have on quantities, neither in the case of τi > τj,
nor in the reverse case.
3.5.3 PPML Regressions
The estimations in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 were conducted on log-linearised data and
as pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), due to Jensens inequality, estimates
could be severely biased as additional heterogeneity is introduced into the data
that not only affects the variance but also biases the point estimate. Therefore,
we follow the recent advances in the literature and estimate the gravity model
in its multiplicative form, utilising the PPML estimator proposed by Silva and
Tenreyro (2006). The results from this exercise are presented in Table 3.4. The
negative coefficient for τi in column (1), though insignificant, seems puzzling.
But as shown in column (3), this result is driven by the negative effect that active
TPR have on the tax rate. The result from the first two tables is confirmed
that τi has a negative effect once TPR are in place, indicating that less trade
commences when the tax rate difference increases. The effect is smaller in size,
-2.89 percent compared to the -4.63 percent from column (5) of Table 3.2 for
one percent increase in τi, but still statistically and economically significant.
The difference in coefficient size is a common finding when comparing results
from log-linearised models to models estimated by PPML and has been at the
heart of the critique by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Column (4) indicates no
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Table 3.4: Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Quantity - PPML
Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Exports
τi -0.139 2.147 0.449 2.146 0.635 3.425
∗∗∗
(0.420) (1.328) (0.461) (1.305) (0.475) (1.265)
τj -0.038 1.053 -0.002 1.058 0.015 0.399
(0.494) (0.947) (0.477) (1.494) (0.477) (1.450)
TPRi 0.048 -0.077 1.198
∗∗∗ -0.073 1.215∗∗∗ -0.567
(0.045) (0.106) (0.288) (0.547) (0.291) (0.519)
τi · TPRi -3.334∗∗∗ -3.422∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.849)
τj · TPRi -0.008 1.064
(1.223) (1.192)
CFCi 0.119 0.619
∗∗∗
(0.0833) (0.108)
TCRi -0.075 0.171
∗
(0.048) (0.097)
N 18,827 6,670 18,827 6,670 18,827 6,670
F − Test – – 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.043
Notes: PPML regressions for the gravity model in multiplicative form. Cluster-
Robust standard errors on the country-pair level are in parentheses. All es-
timations include the logarithm of GDP for both countries, a set of dummies
controlling for economic integration and year fixed effects as control variables.
Coefficients are omitted for brevity. F-Test shows the p-value for a test of joint
significance of the tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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effect of TPR on quantities for cases where τi < τj. This somewhat contrasts
the earlier findings but as becomes evident from column (6), CFC rules play a
major role, which is again in line with the findings from Table 3.3. In summary,
the PPML results confirm the qualitative results from the log-linearised model,
namely the importance of TPR as an anti-avoidance measure when τi > τj and
the dominance of CFC rules when τi < τj. The coefficients are smaller in size,
which confirms the findings of previous authors regarding differences between
log-linearised models estimated via OLS and multiplicative models estimated
via PPML.
3.5.4 Effect on Value
The COMTRADE data also include the value of an export. Value is defined as
the product of price and quantity and therefore, the results should show a mix-
ture of the price and the quantity reaction to the introduction of TPR. Given
the way previous studies have identified the pricing reaction (Clausing, 2003;
Lohse and Riedel, 2013), we would expect to see an decrease in the magnitude
of the effect for value when compared to the quantity reaction alone. This is
because the pricing and quantity reaction should have opposite signs: Following
the introduction of TPR, prices should be reduced (increased) and quantities in-
creased (reduced) when exports were overvalued (undervalued), Table 3.5 shows
a replication of the quantity regressions from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The negative
influence of TPR is also visible in column (3) where τi > τj, but no value reac-
tion can be inferred for the opposite case. Here, column (6) indicates again that
CFC rules are the predominant anti-avoidance measure to influence exports,
also when measured by value.
Given the differences found between OLS estimates and PPML estimates,
we proceed to re-estimate the PPML regressions from Table 3.4 for the value
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Log of Value of Exports
ln τi 2.683
∗∗∗ 2.008 4.402∗∗∗ 1.903 4.593∗∗∗ 2.055
(0.577) (1.969) (0.657) (1.947) (0.664) (2.287)
ln τj -1.580
∗∗∗ 2.626∗ -1.526∗∗∗ 3.515∗∗ -1.534∗∗∗ 2.111
(0.561) (1.384) (0.545) (1.773) (0.543) (1.680)
TPRi 2.182
∗∗∗ 0.650 2.200∗∗∗ -0.084
(0.332) (0.631) (0.329) (0.595)
ln τi · TPRi -6.584∗∗∗ -6.759∗∗∗
(1.082) (1.070)
ln τj · TPRi -1.859 -0.008
(1.940) (1.846)
CFCi 0.194
∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.116)
TCRi -0.129
∗∗ 0.025
(0.057) (0.124)
N 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119
R2 0.309 0.145 0.316 0.145 0.317 0.159
F − Test – – 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.285
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of Equation (3.3) using the logarithm of value instead
of quantity as the dependent variable. Cluster-Robust standard errors on the country-
pair level are in parentheses. All estimations include the logarithm of GDP for both
countries, a set of dummies controlling for economic integration and year fixed effects
as control variables. Coefficients are omitted for brevity. F-Test shows the p-value
for a test of joint significance of the tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Value - PPML
Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Value of Exports
τi -0.404 0.327 -0.138 0.278 -0.0431 1.791
(0.336) (1.167) (0.372) (1.218) (0.378) (1.314)
τj -0.480 0.144 -0.452 -1.066 -0.443 -1.522
(0.474) (0.793) (0.467) (1.055) (0.468) (0.970)
TPRi 0.0269 -0.183
∗∗ 0.505∗∗ -0.924∗∗ 0.538∗∗ -1.206∗∗∗
(0.0408) (0.0849) (0.242) (0.361) (0.243) (0.349)
τi · TPRi -1.370∗∗ -1.462∗∗
(0.689) (0.690)
τj · TPRi 1.863∗∗ 2.535∗∗∗
(0.838) (0.828)
CFCi 0.0769 0.537
∗∗∗
(0.0701) (0.107)
TCRi -0.00534 0.264
∗∗
(0.0416) (0.107)
N 18,827 6,670 18,827 6,670 18,827 6,670
F − Test – – 0.052 0.063 0.057 0.004
Notes: PPML regressions for the gravity model in multiplicative form. Cluster-
Robust standard errors on the country-pair level are in parentheses. All estimations
include the logarithm of GDP for both countries, a set of dummies controlling for
economic integration and year fixed effects as control variables. Coefficients are
omitted for brevity. F-Test shows the p-value for a test of joint significance of the
tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Price Reaction to TPR
PPML OLS
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Quantity Reaction -2.787 1.463 -4.695 2.295
Value Reaction -1.505 1.013 -2.166 2.103
pcrit 0.54 0.69 0.46 0.92
Price Reaction > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Notes: The table shows estimated signs of the price reaction to
the introduction of TPR. The price reaction is conditional on the
price being larger than pcrit.
of exports. The results in Table 3.6 differ from their OLS counterparts, most
notably in the joint significance of the tax rate and TPR in cases where τi < τj.
Columns (4) and (6) both show significant positive effects on the value of exports
that are attributable to the introduction of TPR.
Having estimated the effects of TPR on the value of exports, we would
like to validate that the pricing effect, which is implicitly in the value effect,
has the expected sign. Thus, we would like the pricing effect to be positive
(negative) when τi > τj (τi < τj). The magnitude of the value effects is smaller
in absolute terms than the quantity effects in both settings. Table 3.7 shows
the estimated effects that a tax rate increase has, given that TPR are in place.
The coefficients for the PPML columns are taken from columns (5) and (6) of
Tables 3.4 (Quantity) and 3.6 (Value) respectively, where we also control for
other anti-avoidance measures. The OLS results are taken from columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3.3 (Quantity) and columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5.7 The
difference between the quantity and the value effect is driven by the pricing
7We focus on the discussion of the PPML results, although the results for the OLS results
are similar and the arguments brought forward apply idem dito.
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reaction to taxation. Because
v(τ) = p(τ) · q(τ), (3.4)
we can decompose the effect of an increase in τ 8 on v(τ) by the total differential
to obtain:
dv(τ) =
∂v
∂p
∂p
∂τ
+
∂v
∂q
∂q
∂τ
. (3.5)
The partial derivatives of the value with respect to price and quantity are just
q(τ) and p(τ) respectively and both strictly non-negative. Implicitly, we abstract
from cross elasticities of prices and quantities, which should play a smaller role
in intermediate goods trade than in trade in final goods. Additionally, we can
justify this by the large share of intra-firm trade in intermediate goods trade,
which amassed to around 45% for the US in 2013.9 The reaction of the quantity
to an increase in τ , measured by ∂q
∂τ
in Equation (3.5), is known from the quantity
regressions and displayed in the row Quantity in Table 3.7. Likewise, the total
reaction of the value is also known and displayed in the row V alue of the table.
Taking all information together, we can show that the pricing effect in the case
of τi > τj is given by
∂p
∂τi
=
2.787p− 1.505
q
(3.6)
and for the opposite case by
∂p
∂τj
=
1.013− 1.463p
q
. (3.7)
As soon as p surpasses its critical value of pcrit = 0.54 in Equation (3.6)
8Subscripts i and j have, without loss of generality, been dropped for brevity. When
τi > τj , the exposition refers to τi and in the opposite case to τj .
9Own calculation on the basis of data from BEA (intra-firm trade in manufacturing) and
WITS (total trade in intermediate goods).
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or pcrit = 0.69 in Equation (3.7), we can unambiguously derive the sign of the
pricing reaction. In the former case, ∂p
∂τi
is positive, indicating that prices are
corrected upwards when τi increases, following the introduction of TPR. This is
in line with the ex ante manipulation of prices and the undervaluation of exports
in cases where the tax rate of the partner country is lower than the tax rate of
the exporting country. In the latter case, ∂p
∂τj
is negative, which hints at an
overvaluation of exports prior to the introduction of TPR. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations of the average prices in our sample (we simply assume p = v/q)
indicate that only 0.39% of all prices are below the critical value when τi > τj
and 3.9% in the opposite case. In other words, for nearly all observed trade
flows, we find that TPR must have the expected effect on pricing behaviour,
namely price increases when exports are undervalued and price decreases when
exports are overvalued.
3.5.5 Discussion
The results presented here indicate a substantial response in traded quantities
following the introduction of TPR. They show the presence of allocative ineffi-
ciencies through exploitation of tax rate differentials by MNEs. Our results are
consistent with the hypothesis that TPR help to partly correct these misalloc-
ations, as we find a reduction in traded quantities with countries that have a
lower tax rate than the exporting country. This suggests that part of the trade
in intermediate goods between two countries was purely driven by tax consid-
erations. Following the introduction of TPR, this channel, became unprofitable
and we observe relatively more trade with countries that exhibit a higher tax
rate than the exporting country.
Our findings confirm the results from earlier studies on the misuse of transfer
prices on the firm level: Clausing (2003) reports significant distortions of prices
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and Davies et al. (2015) find low internal prices for low tax trading partners,
especially very low tax trading partners such as tax havens. We add to this by
showing that quantities were distorted as well, amplifying the effect of TPR.
Whilst the manipulation of transfer prices is de facto a manipulation of book-
keeping, manipulation of quantities can have real economic consequences such as
labour market responses and any regulatory changes should therefore carefully
consider the reaction in quantities.
In line with Lohse and Riedel (2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015), we can
identify that TPR have a dampening effect on profit shifting behaviour, which
is also visible in traded quantities. Thus, we are able to show that following the
introduction of TPR, quantities exported to lower tax countries are reduced.
This could in turn lead to negative real responses in the respective low tax
countries, at least from a global welfare perspective.
We analysed the interplay of different anti-avoidance measures and are able
to find evidence for concerns raised by some authors that the isolated consider-
ation of an anti-avoidance measure could lead to biased estimates as the joint
effect is neglected. Especially for TPR and CFC rules, we can identify some
substitutional effects, but in line with the findings from OECD (2015), we do
not find TPR and CFC rules to be perfect substitutes. Where TPR are the
dominant force in controlling profit shifting behaviour when τi > τj, CFC rules
have the strongest effect in when τi < τj. TCR play no role when analysing
quantities but because they only affect the financing structure of firms, which
does not require any trade to take place, this could be expected from the data
we look at.
Next to analysing the effect of TPR on quantities in a log-linearised model,
we also showed results from estimations of a multiplicative model via PPML.
As advocated by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), OLS estimates of the log-linearised
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model could be severely biased and although we found significant quantitative
differences in the estimated coefficients arising from this, the qualitative results
remain the same. This is in line with several previous studies from the interna-
tional trade literature that compared OLS and PPML results, such as Baltagi
et al. (2014), Go´mez-Herrera (2013) and Silva and Tenreyro (2011).
Utilising the value of exports, we were able to identify the sign of the pricing
reaction. In cases where there was an incentive to undervalue exports in order
to minimise profits accrued in the exporting country, we find a positive pricing
reaction following the introduction of TPR. Likewise, when an incentive existed
to overvalue exports, because the exporting nation was the country with the
lowest tax rate, TPR seem to correct prices downward. Both results resemble
the findings of earlier studies, for example Lohse and Riedel (2013), Zinn et al.
(2014) or Cristea and Nguyen (2013).
3.6 Conclusion
We analyse the effect of transfer pricing regulations on international trade flows
in intermediate goods. We exploit bilateral trade data for the automobile in-
dustry from the BACI database for the years 1995 to 2012, as well as information
on the introduction of transfer pricing regulations from Deloitte, Ernst&Young,
KPMG and PWC. We find evidence that is in line with the ex ante manipulation
of transfer prices for tax optimising reasons. This reduces trade quantities for
importing countries with higher tax rates than the exporting country and sig-
nificantly increases trade quantities with countries that exhibit lower tax rates.
The effects are strongly driven by the tax rate difference, which is as expected
given that the tax rate difference represents the incentive to manipulate transfer
prices for profit shifting purposes.
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Furthermore, our results indicate that different anti-avoidance measures in-
teract and especially TPR and CFC rules can be seen as partial substitutes.
This implies that countries that already sustain either TPR or CFC rules should
consider the adverse effects that the introduction of the second anti-avoidance
measure could have on the existing one. Utilising the value of exports, we were
also able to identify the commonly acknowledged signs of the pricing reaction
to the introduction of TPR. TPR act as a corrective both to under- as well as
overvalued exports.
A potential shortcoming of our study is the focus on one industry. The
automotive industry is characterised by highly specialised products that are
seldomly traded with unrelated third parties, thus providing ample opportunities
for the manipulation of transfer prices. We would thus expect the effectiveness
of TPR to decrease or even vanish when looking at less specialised or more open
sectors. Especially when looking at intermediate goods trade as a whole, the
positive effects of TPR on the reduction of transfer mispricing in cases where
the opportunities are manifold could be confounded by the insignificance of
TPR for other sectors of the economy. Given the significant economic burden
on companies and the tax administration, social desirability of TPR depends
on the extent of sectors present in an economy that have the opportunity to
excessively manipulate transfer prices. Our study adds to the discussion that
the allocative distortions through the quantity reactions need to be considered
on top of the pricing reactions.
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Chapter 3 documented a significant reaction of firms to the introduction of
TPR in line with prior manipulation of transfer prices. The chapter provided
evidence both for manipulated prices and distortions in traded quantities that
were reduced following the introduction of TPR. Furthermore, the point was
stressed that the effects of TPR are multi-dimensional and that - just as in
the case of individual taxation and the equity-efficiency trade-off - a trade-off
between the price and the quantity of an exported good exists, which needs
careful balancing in order to keep the tax base broad and the taxable income
high.
We showed that tax policy can be utilised to correct misallocations in the
market via disincentives such as TPR, leading to a more efficient allocation
of goods. But the question remains whether tax incentives also lead to the
desired effect of increased efficiency. By analysing the effect of a tax incentive for
R&D, namely the intellectual property box (IP-Box), Chapter 4 is dedicated to
this question. IP-Boxes are by and large a European phenomenon and thus well
suited in the context of this thesis that has analysed tax policies in place in the
EU. They are designed to encourage R&D by setting lower tax rates on income
derived from patents or other intellectual property. The coverage and the extent
of the tax reductions vary between the countries implementing IP-Box regimes.
Especially the development condition, which declares that only newly developed
patents are eligible for the reduced tax rate under the IP-Box regime, is only
present in three countries, thus raising questions over the effectiveness of the
IP-Box as a R&D incentive.
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Opening Pandora’s Box - Do
Intellectual Property Boxes
Foster Innovation?
4.1 Introduction
The concept of an intellectual property box (IP-Box) is to grant tax exemptions
or reductions for intellectual property such as patents. Countries implementing
a patent box regime argue that lower tax rates on income from the use of patents
foster innovation and increase employment in the R&D sector.1 Critics accuse
theses regimes of creating incentives for multinational enterprises (MNE) to
strategically shift their intangible assets into the countries implementing an IP-
Box regime to minimise their effective tax burden (Evers et al., 2015; Griffith
et al., 2014).
A government that incentivises patent application can do this for two reasons:
1See, for example, the Dutch tax authorities http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/
connect/bldcontentnl/belastingdienst/zakelijk/winst/vennootschapsbelasting/
innovatiebox (only available in Dutch). Last accessed 18.06.2017.
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1. Stimulate R&D within the country and 2. Attracting foreign R&D, i.e. the
research is conducted in a foreign country and the patent is applied for tax
saving purposes in the country offering incentives. Both could be viable goals of
a government, as both effects should increase tax revenue. However, especially
in recent times, public opinion has fallen out with the attraction of foreign R&D
as many MNE extensively use such tax incentives to minimise their effective tax
burden.2 Therefore, governments implementing IP-Box regimes have a strong
incentive to highlight the real response (more domestic R&D).
I exploit the potential difference between the location of the inventor and
the location of the applicant of a patent to disentangle the innovation response
from the shifting responses. If an inventor resides in the same country as the
applicant, the patent is considered home grown. An increase in the number of
home grown patents following the introduction of an IP-Box regime would be
evidence in favour of the real response channel. If an inventor of a patent resides
in a different country from the applicant, however, the patent is considered as
shifted. An increase in the number of shifted patents following the IP-Box in-
troduction will be in favour of the shifting channel. Note, though, that both
channels could potentially coexist and from the perspective of a budget maxim-
ising government, both effects can be desirable.
The paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, tax incentives
play a crucial role in fostering R&D (Bloom et al., 2002; Lokshin and Mohnen,
2013), especially for smaller firms (Bronzini and Iachini, 2014). Furthermore,
R&D tax incentives play a role in the location of R&D (Grubert, 2003; Hines Jr,
1994). The tax incentives analysed in many previous studies are ex-ante incent-
ives, i.e. incentives that are given before the innovation process has finished.
These include direct incentives, such as grants, as well as indirect incentives,
2Cases of minimising tax burdens by reallocation of intellectual property have been wide-
spread in the media for the likes of Apple, Starbucks, IKEA and other global MNEs.
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such as wage subsidies for workers in R&D or reduced wage tax rates for R&D
employees.3 IP-Boxes are an ex-post incentive, as only successful R&D (in the
form of a patent) is rewarded. In this sense, whilst the classical R&D incentives
aim at encouraging any type of R&D, IP-Box regimes should only affect suc-
cessful R&D, which are considered to be a signal of quality (Czarnitzki et al.,
2014).
A second strand of the literature has addressed IP-Box regimes, with a com-
prehensive overview of IP-Box regimes and their theoretical effects on the ef-
fective average tax rate given in Evers et al. (2015) and a more detailed analysis
of different IP-Box characteristics in Alstadsater et al. (2015), though only for
three industries. Both studies find that there is no direct impact of IP-Box
regimes on innovation activities and shifting of patents is the predominant re-
action. In a recent study, Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2016) show that IP-Box
regimes can have at least partial positive spill-over effects on R&D investments
across countries and therefore could globally lead to more R&D.4 Such a positive
effect of tax differentials on (immobile) R&D investment is also documented in
Beer (2015).
Third, there exist some prior work on the fact that MNEs react to tax incent-
ives with reallocation of (in-)tangible assets (Bo¨hm et al., 2015; Dischinger and
Riedel, 2011; Griffith et al., 2014), for an overview of recent empirical evidence
on tax-motivated profit shifting see Dharmapala (2014).
The literature has thus provided arguments in favour of the positive effect
of IP-Box regimes on R&D investments as well as evidence that IP-Boxes could
facilitate profit shifting. The question remains, which channel potentially dom-
inates and is at the heart of this study. I add to the literature by analysing both
3For an overview of R&D tax incentives that are currently in place in Europe see CPB
et al. (2015).
4Note that I do not refer to knowledge spill-overs but to spill-overs through the tax incentive
and the expected increase in net return.
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channels simultaneously on the country level and providing, based on the main
results, a rationale for the crowding out of home grown patents following the in-
troduction of an IP-Box regime. The analysis provides evidence in favour of the
shifting channel but finds negative effects of the IP-Box regime on home grown
patents, thus not only rejecting the claim that IP-Boxes foster innovation in the
country they are implemented in but actually suggesting that local innovative
activities are reduced. A positive effect on the total number of patents cannot
be identified, further suggesting a replacement of home developed patents by
foreign developed patents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the
institutional setting, especially the different characteristics of IP-Box regimes.
The methodology as well as the data are presented in section 4.3. Section 4.4
discusses the results of the baseline regressions and of several robustness checks.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Setting
An intellectual property box is designed to allow income derived from patents or
other intellectual property to be taxed more beneficially. The scope of other in-
tellectual property that is also governed by the IP-Box regime differs by country,
as does the design and extent of the tax benefit. All IP-Boxes include income
from the use of patents (royalties), but some also include trademarks, designs
or copyrights. The tax benefit can be a reduced tax rate on income that falls
into an IP-box but can be granted as wage tax deductions for workers in R&D
as well or as a reduction in the tax base. An overview of the different designs of
IP-Box regimes in European OECD countries is given in Table 4.1. The main
feature of an IP-box is its effective tax rate, which is substantially lower than
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Table 4.1: IP-Box Regimes in European OECD Countries until 2014
Year Tax rate Qualifying Income Acquired IP Existing IP Larger Scope
Belgium 2007 0.068
Royalties, Sales in-
come, Notional royal-
ties
No No No
France 2000 0.1676
Royalties, Capital
gains
Yes Yes No
Hungary 2003 0.095
Royalties, Capital
gains
Yes Yes Yes
Ireland 2008a) - - - - -
Luxembourg 2008 0.0441
Royalties, Capital
gains, Sales income,
Notional royalties
Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands 2007 0.05
Royalties, Capital
gains, Sales income,
Notional royalties
No No Yes
Portugal 2014 0.15
Royalties, Capital
gains
No No Yes
Spain 2008 0.12
Royalties, Capital
gains
No Yes Yes
United Kingdom 2013 0.10
Royalties, Capital
gains, Sales income,
Notional royalties
Yes Yes No
Notes: Year indicates the year of enactment. Tax rate refers to the tax rate under the IP-Box regime. a) Ireland
abolished the IP-Box system (and reintroduced it in 2016). Qualifying income indicates all possible qualifying
income. Larger scope refers to more kinds of IP protection than patents and supplementary protection certificates.
Data taken from (Evers et al., 2015), Alstadsater et al. (2015) and European Tax Handbooks.
the headline corporate tax rates that apply in the respective countries. Belgium
for example has a difference of 27.2 percentage points between the corporate
tax rate and the IP-Box rate, whilst Hungary only offers a 9.5 percentage points
reduction. Therefore, next to analysing the extensive margin effects of intro-
ducing an IP-Box, the tax benefit it offers (i.e. the intensive margin) can also
deliver important insights.
IP-Boxes are designed to foster innovation and therefore should not allow
existing IP to qualify for the preferential tax rate. This is only the case in
Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal. So in order to qualify for the IP-Box tax
rate, innovation must necessarily take place, at least from a global perspective.
The treatment of existing IP has also been one of the main criticisms of IP-
Box regimes and has resulted in the emergence of the Modified Nexus Approach
(Action 5 of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan). It suggests minimum levels of
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economic activity that should be carried out in the country where the applicant
resides, if the applicant wants to benefit from the IP-Box tax rate.5 Inside the
EU however, any level of research that is to be undertaken in the country of
residence of the applicant is allowed to be undertaken in any member state, to
be in accordance with the Freedom of Movement Act.
The development conditions in place link the purely ex-post incentives of the
IP-Box to the original, ex-ante, research. Ex-post incentives for research and
innovation, such as general protection from a patent or the beneficial tax rate
under an IP-Box regime, only apply to successful research, i.e. if a patentable
idea arose from the R&D activity. Therefore, it is unclear how they stimulate
research in general. Including a development condition in the setup of an IP-
Box regime circumvents this problem as the beneficial tax rate is only granted if
some innovative activity took place. So for a government that aims at increasing
R&D, a development condition of some sort in the IP-Box design is necessary
in order to be credible. If the aim of the IP-Box regime is to attract foreign IP,
though, a development condition is not necessary and can even harm this goal.
In light of this, France, Hungary, Luxembourg and the UK are expected to be
particularly attractive locations for foreign developed patents.
4.3 Data and Methodology
To uncover the effect of IP-boxes on innovation activities, measured by the num-
ber of patents, I exploit the (possible) difference between inventor and applicant
of a patent. Inventors are the actual developers of the patent, i.e. the group
5Although the BEPS Action Plan consists of suggestions, several countries have altered or
will change their IP-Box regimes to incorporate the modified nexus approach. These include
Belgium (2016), Hungary (2016), the Netherlands (2017), Portugal (2016), Spain (2016) and
the UK (2016). Luxembourg has abolished its IP-Box regime in 2016 following the BEPS
Action Plan.
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between Inventor and Applicant
Country A
Country A
Inventor Applicant
Country B
home grown
shifting
that creates the innovation. Applicants can either be legal or natural persons
that apply for the patent to be granted. It is possible to develop a patent in
one country and have the application to the patent office in a different country.
Especially for tax saving purposes, it can be beneficial to locate patents in jur-
isdictions that offer preferential tax rates, for example in the form of an IP-Box.
Patents that are shifted can be identified as those patents, where the inventor is
located in another country as the applicant.6 On the contrary, if inventor and
applicant are located in the same country, this patent is considered to be home
grown, i.e. not shifted. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.1. As innovation
boxes are described by policy makers to foster innovation, one would assume to
detect a rise in home grown patents, with the effect on shifted patents being a
priori ambiguous.
Data on patents come from the EPO’s PATSTAT database (version Au-
tumn 2014)7, which covers worldwide patent applications. Specifically, data on
the applicant and the inventor are used to identify whether a patent is home
grown or shifted. I use the years 1990 to 2009 as sample period and focus on
6It is important to mention that this is the country of residence of the inventor or applicant
and thus the country, where tax benefits can accrue. This comparison gives no indication on
the location of the patent office, where the patent was applied for, which is irrelevant for this
study.
7Access was kindly provided by Datenlabor Hohenheim.
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OECD countries, because they are a relatively homogeneous group in terms
of industrial development and innovation. Furthermore, I focus only on pat-
ents that are applied for in countries that are member states of the European
Patent Organisation.8 All member states grant patents in accordance with the
European Patent Convention and therefore, similar monetary and legal costs
apply. It is important to stress that the scope of the patent, i.e. its coverage,
can be set similarly at all patent offices. Thus, there is no substantive difference
between the rights a firm can obtain when applying for a patent in any of the
member states. This makes the patents more comparable and hedges against
concerns that firms strategically relocate their patents for other than tax related
motives.
Several difficulties arise in constructing the data set from the raw
PATSTAT data, which stem from one feature of a patent: more often than
not, patents are developed by several inventors, applied for by more than one
applicant at a number of different authorities. Therefore, each case needs
to be treated separately, in order to avoid counting some patent applications
twice whilst leaving out others. Per se, the different authorities a patent is
applied at do not affect the outcome of this paper, as the country of resid-
ency of the applicant is the determinant of whether tax benefits are granted or
not. But the patent office dimension still needs to be considered in order to
avoid wrong aggregation of the data. In total, eight possible cases can arise,
of which four are easy to treat and four are harder to disentangle. For ease of
comprehension, I shall introduce the following notation to separate the cases:
(N(inventor),N(applicant),N(authority)). An overview of the cases is shown in
Table 4.2.
The first and simplest case is a patent that has one inventor, one applicant
8A list of all 38 member states and their date of entry into the organisation can be found
in the appendix.
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Table 4.2: Combinations of Inventors, Applicants and Authorities
Inventor Applicant Authority
Case 1 1 1 1
Case 2 1 1 many
Case 3 1 many 1
Case 4 1 many many
Case 5 many 1 1
Case 6 many 1 many
Case 7 many many 1
Case 8 many many many
Notes: The table shows the different com-
binations of inventors, applicants and au-
thorities considered. Many refers to more
than one in each case.
and one authority, thus making it case (1,1,1). To obtain the number of patents
per country code of the inventor, country code of the applicant and year, one can
simply count the number of observations that satisfy these criteria. The second
case considered is (1,1,m). Here, the applicant has applied at several authorities
but naturally can only claim the tax benefit for one patent. Therefore, for each
unique combination of inventor and applicant, the year the patent was first
applied for is kept, as this allowed for the tax benefit to be claimed.9 For case
(1,m,1), we have several applicants for one patent. Potentially, these could all
claim tax benefits for the patent, hence they need to be treated as separate
observations and I proceed like in case (1,1,1). In a combination of the cases
(1,1,m) and (1,m,1), for case (1,m,m) I keep all the applicants, but if an applicant
9As an example, a patent could be applied for at the German patent office in 1995 and
at the US patent office in 1996 to extend its coverage. Relevant for this analysis is then the
first date that the patent was applied for, hence the application to the German patent office
in 1995.
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has several authorities, I again keep only the oldest observation.
Up until now, I have only considered the cases where one inventor is present.
These were straightforward to handle but as soon as more than one inventor is
present, the situation becomes more complex. The underlying question is, how
a patent can be classified as home grown or shifted if inventors potentially reside
in different countries? Three scenarios are possible: Classify a patent as a home
grown patent as soon as one of the inventors resides in the same country as the
applicant (”Domestic”), classify a patent as shifted patent as soon as one of
the inventors resided in a different country from the applicant (”Foreign”) and
construct weights from the number of home and foreign inventors and treat the
patent as being partly home grown and partly shifted (”Weighted”). Because
each of the three scenarios can potentially affect the conclusions, the analysis
is carried out for each scenario separately. Under the different peculiarities of
scenarios Domestic, Foreign and Weighted, cases (m,1,1), (m,1,m), (m,m,1) and
(m,m,m) are dealt with in the same manner as their counterparts with one
inventor, i.e. (1,1,1), (1,1,m), (1,m,1) and (1,m,m) respectively.
Next to all patent related data from PATSTAT, data on corporate income
tax rates from the OECD as well as data on further control variables from the
World Development Indicators of the World Bank are exploited to estimate
the effect of IP-Boxes on the creation and location of intangible assets in
the form of patents. Specifically, I run two different regression models. The
estimation equation of the first model is given by:
lnPatentslit = α + β1ipboxit + Xit
′γ + θi + δt + εit, (4.1)
and for the second model by:
lnPatentslit = α + β2taxbenefitit + Xit
′γ + θi + δt + εit. (4.2)
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lnPatentslit is the logarithm of one of the l categories, with l being either
the total number of patents, the number of patents classified as home developed
or the number of patents classified as shifted. ipboxit is a dummy specifying
whether country i had an IP-Box regime in place in year t. taxbenefitit refers
to the actual reduction in the tax rate for intellectual property and is defined
as corporate tax rate less IP-Box tax rate. Naturally, this will be zero for
countries that do not offer an IP-Box, as their tax rate on intellectual property
is the same as on all other corporate activities. Xit is a vector of country level
controls that include the logarithm of GDP per capita and the unemployment
rate. They capture the time-varying heterogeneity between the countries that
could influence at least the location decision for a patent. Because the countries
in the sample differ in certain characteristics that are fixed over time, a set of
country fixed effects θi is included. To account for a general upward trend in
patent development, δt is included as a set of time fixed effects. εit is an error
term.
4.4 Results
This section shows the results from estimating Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Next
to the baseline results, I show several robustness checks.
4.4.1 Baseline Results
In the baseline regressions, the fixed effects estimator is used to estimate the
model in order to account for the heterogeneity between the different OECD
countries. Especially Germany, Japan and the United States have substantially
higher numbers of patents than the other countries, which can be captured by
the country fixed effect. Table 4.3 shows the results of estimating Equations (4.1)
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Table 4.3: Baseline Results for Case Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Home Foreign
IP-Box -0.100 -0.286** 1.056*
(0.173) (0.130) (0.540)
Tax Benefit -1.104* -1.623** 3.201
(0.552) (0.609) (2.053)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.044 -0.003 -0.317 -0.321 0.906 1.147
(1.715) (1.737) (1.625) (1.635) (1.410) (1.446)
GDP per Capita 1.877*** 1.868*** 1.992*** 1.966*** 0.934** 1.042**
(0.350) (0.346) (0.333) (0.329) (0.402) (0.507)
Unemployment 0.055** 0.055** 0.023 0.023 0.081** 0.083**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.034)
N 569 569 569 569 569 569
Clusters 34 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.619 0.620 0.702 0.703 0.208 0.167
Notes: Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers only patents
developed in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indicates
that the patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time- and
country-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in par-
enthesis. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
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and (4.2) for case Domestic. Because in this case a patent is only considered
to be foreign when all inventors of the patent are from outside the country of
the applicant, this should provide a precise estimation for the effect of IP-Boxes
on shifted patents. The effect on home-grown patents can be viewed as a lower
bound, because the count of home-grown patents includes patents that were
partly developed outside of the country of the applicant. The standard errors
across all specifications are clustered at the country level to allow for correlation
of the error terms within a given country over the observational period.
In column (1) the effect of an IP-Box as a whole is not statistically different
from zero, implying that the introduction of an IP-Box does not significantly
affect the number of new patents developed and hence not the global innovation
activity. Column (2) shows a marginally significant negative effect of the height
of the tax benefit under the IP-Box regulation on the number of patents de-
veloped. It states that a one percentage point increase in the tax benefit under
the IP-Box regime decreases the number of patents by 1.1 percent. Note that
this result should be viewed with caution as the number of changes in the tax
rate on income from patents has varied only sporadically over the sample period.
More strikingly, the results in column (3) show that the introduction of an
IP-Box regime has a statistically and economically significant negative effect
on the number of home-grown patents. All things equal, the introduction thus
reduces the number of home-grown patents by 24.87 percent. So instead of
increasing innovative activities in the country, the introduction of an IP-Box
regime has substantially harmed R&D in that country. This result is supported
by column (4) when looking at the tax rate on intellectual property: a one
percentage point increase reduce home-grown patents by 1.62 %. Columns (5)
and (6) show the estimation results for foreign patents. The number of foreign
developed patents increased nearly fourfold following the introduction of an IP-
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Box regime. Taken together with the reduction in home-grown patents, the
IP-Box regimes have managed to attract foreign patents that in return crowded
out patents developed at home, leading to no significant increase in the total
number of patents. The beneficial tax rate again seems to be the most important
driver and for every percentage point increase in the tax benefit, 3.2 percent
more patents are attracted from abroad, although this effect falls just short
of being significant at the 10%-level. These results give clear evidence of a
domination of the shifting channel and even suggest that through crowding out
of home development, innovation is hampered rather than encouraged by an
IP-Box regime.
Table 4.4 shows the results for case Foreign, where patents are classified as
foreign as soon as one of the inventors comes from a different country as the ap-
plicant, as well as case Weighted, where a weighted average is used. The general
results from Table 4.3 hold for case Foreign as well, although the positive effect
for the foreign developed patents disappears. When using a weighted average of
foreign and home inventors of a patent, a similar picture to Table 4.3 prevails,
which is due to the relatively higher number of home developed patents over
foreign developed patents. The total number of patents remains insignificantly
affected by the introduction of an IP-Box regime, whilst home developed pat-
ents seem to be crowded out by patents developed in a foreign location. The
remainder of the paper will report the results for case Weighted only, which is
the preferred specification as it takes the relative weights of domestic and foreign
inventors into account.10
The reduction of home grown patents might seem puzzling at first. To un-
derstand the mechanism behind this result, it is necessary to understand that
only MNEs can be responsible for this effect. Applicants that reside only in the
10All results for the other two cases are available from the author upon request.
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Table 4.4: Baseline Results for Case Foreign and Case Weighted
Case Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Home Foreign
IP-Box -0.091 -0.304** 0.686
(0.170) (0.136) (0.420)
Tax Benefit -1.034* -1.727** 1.847
(0.549) (0.642) (1.546)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.130 -0.090 -0.379 -0.384 0.654 0.826
(1.710) (1.732) (1.689) (1.699) (1.259) (1.290)
GDP per Capita 1.883*** 1.875*** 2.114*** 2.086*** 1.173*** 1.239***
(0.356) (0.353) (0.354) (0.349) (0.356) (0.412)
Unemployment 0.057** 0.056** 0.023 0.023 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)
N 569 569 569 569 569 569
Clusters 34 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.619 0.621 0.685 0.685 0.327 0.304
Case Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Home Foreign
IP-Box -0.095 -0.304** 1.056*
(0.177) (0.136) (0.540)
Tax Benefit -1.097* -1.727** 3.201
(0.568) (0.642) (2.053)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.081 -0.039 -0.379 -0.384 0.906 1.147
(1.781) (1.804) (1.689) (1.699) (1.410) (1.446)
GDP per Capita 1.967*** 1.959*** 2.114*** 2.086*** 0.934** 1.042**
(0.368) (0.364) (0.354) (0.349) (0.402) (0.507)
Unemployment 0.058** 0.058** 0.023 0.023 0.081** 0.083**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.034)
N 569 569 569 569 569 569
Clusters 34 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.600 0.602 0.685 0.685 0.208 0.167
Notes: Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers only patents
developed in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indicates
that the patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time- and
country-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in par-
enthesis. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
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country that introduces the IP-Box can only benefit from the lower tax rate and
have no incentive to reduce R&D. A possible rationale for the crowding out of
home developed patents (by MNEs) can be seen in the following example.
Consider a MNE active in two countries A and B, with A having a lower tax
rate than B (τA < τB). Because of the tax differential, the MNE prefers to hold
the patent in country A (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). Shifting of intangible
assets is assumed to be free of cost. To develop a patent that reaps an expected
net payoff E[pii(1 − τA)], the MNE has to incur costs ci in country i, with
i = A,B. ci is an increasing function of the quality of the researchers, so that
better quality patents come at the cost of more expensive research. Furthermore,
due to tax exemptions, the costs are not affected by the tax rate.11 Assume that
a patent developed in country A has a lower expected net payoff, as well as a
lower cost, such that:
E[piA(1− τA)]− cA > E[piB(1− τA)]− cB (4.3)
in the initial situation. Therefore, the MNE will develop the patent in country A,
even though E[piB] > E[piA]. Now country A implements an IP-Box regime with
a tax rate τ IPA < τA. This will increase expected net payoffs as
∂E[pii(1−τA)]
∂(1−τA) > 0
for i = A,B. For sufficiently low τ IPA , keeping pii and ci constant for i = A,B,
it holds that
E[piA(1− τ IPA )]− cA < E[piB(1− τ IPA )]− cB (4.4)
and the decision of the initial situation will be reversed. It is now optimal for
the MNE to develop the patent in country B and shift it to country A. This
is consistent with the observation that R&D in country A is reduced and the
number of shifted patents increases.
11A derivation with the tax rate affecting the cost of developing a patent is relegated to the
appendix.
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For simplicity and ease of notation, the line of argumentation followed before
considers only costless shifting. It is possible to extend the analysis to incor-
porate shifting costs, which will require an even stronger tax incentive to make
shifting profitable. Especially if the IP-Box regime contains a development con-
dition12 or does not allow acquired IP to be taxed under the IP-Box tax rate,
the costs of developing a patent in country B with the intention to shift it to
country A increases. The higher the fraction of R&D that needs to be carried
out locally, the lower is the probability that the MNE will benefit from shifting
the patent from country B to country A, instead of developing it in country A
straightaway. Because only three countries in the sample have a development
condition in place, the assumption of (near) costless shifting seems plausible.
4.4.2 Sectoral Heterogeneity
Patents and the expected benefit thereof can potentially differ, depending on
the sector they were developed for. This is due to the heterogeneous techno-
logical sophistication of the respective sectors. To analyse this heterogeneity
between sectors, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the estimation results from rerunning
the analysis per sector of the IPC classification scheme. In total, eight sec-
tors are defined and as shown in the 4th column of both tables, the number
of patents applied for in the sample period varies considerably from 297,315 in
Sector D: Textiles and Paper to 2,037,537 in Sector B: Performing Operations
and Transporting.
Column (1) shows the estimated coefficient for the IP-Box dummy (Table
4.5) and the tax benefit (Table 4.6) in the regression of total number of patents.
Compared to the baseline results for the full sample, considerable heterogeneity
12This requires that (part of) the research for the patent has to be carried out in the country
that grants the preferential tax rate under an IP-Box regime, which has also been put forward
by the OECD as the modified nexus approach.
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Table 4.5: Per Sector Analysis (Case Weighted)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Home Foreign No. of Patents
Coefficient: IP-Box Dummy
A: Human Necessities -0.165 -0.124 0.537** 801,291
(0.179) (0.192) (0.245)
B: Performing Operations; Transporting 0.174 -0.025 0.376 2,037,537
(0.315) (0.369) (0.245)
C: Chemistry; Metallurgy -0.164 -0.177 0.502 1,321,558
(0.170) (0.193) (0.356)
D: Textiles; Paper 0.387** 0.005 0.962** 297,315
(0.181) (0.221) (0.440)
E: Fixed Constructions 0.272 0.188 0.781*** 538,571
(0.330) (0.296) (0.284)
F: Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating 0.227 0.089 0.575*** 1,193,086
(0.248) (0.236) (0.167)
G: Physics -0.028 -0.164 0.670** 1,595,945
(0.292) (0.310) (0.319)
H: Electricity 0.030 -0.058 0.597** 1,432,381
(0.211) (0.213) (0.279)
Notes: The table shows the value of the coefficient on the IP-Box dummy from the baseline
regression (Equation (4.1)), carried out for a sub sample of each sector separately. Sectors are
defined as per top-level IPC classification. No. of patents gives the number of patents in the
sample in the respective sector. Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers
only patents developed in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indicates
that the patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time- and country-
fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parenthesis. *,** and
*** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
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Table 4.6: Per Sector Analysis (Case Weighted)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Home Foreign N
Coefficient: Tax Benefit
A: Human Necessities -1.362* -0.721 2.087 801,291
(0.715) (0.950) (1.248)
B: Performing Operations; Transporting -0.229 -1.241 1.339 2,037,537
(1.240) (1.678) (1.503)
C: Chemistry; Metallurgy -1.288* -1.049 1.761 1,321,558
(0.697) (0.891) (1.659)
D: Textiles; Paper 2.002** -0.088 5.137** 297,315
(0.821) (1.108) (2.001)
E: Fixed Constructions 0.149 0.181 3.005* 538,571
(1.048) (0.980) (1.573)
F: Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating 0.376 -0.168 2.646*** 1,193,086
(0.843) (0.952) (0.828)
G: Physics -1.289 -1.816 2.486 1,595,945
(1.235) (1.385) ( 1.718)
H: Electricity -0.190 -0.399 2.579* 1,432,381
(0.869) (0.946) (1.372)
Notes: The table shows the value of the coefficient on tax benefit from the baseline regres-
sion (Equation (4.1)), carried out for a sub sample of each sector separately. Sectors are
defined as per top-level IPC classification. N gives the number of patents in the sample in
the respective sector. Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers only
patents developed in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indic-
ates that the patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time-
and country-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in
parenthesis. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
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is observable, especially in the regressions for the tax benefit. Whilst the sec-
tors Human Necessities and Chemistry; Metallurgy show a similar negative and
statistically significant effect of the tax benefit on the total number of patents,
the coefficient turns insignificant for the other sectors and even positive and
significant for the Textiles; Paper sector.
The effect on home developed patents remains negative (except for Fixed
Constructions) in Table 4.6, but loses its significance compared to the aggregate
estimation. The pattern for foreign developed patents remains the same in
the sectoral analysis and especially sectors Fixed Constructions and Mechanical
Engineering; Lighting; Heating react strongly to the introduction of the IP-Box
regime (as measured by the dummy) as well as to changes in the tax benefit.
Over all sectors, I find a positive coefficient for the Foreign specification
and a statistically insignificant effect on the total number of patents developed.
The Textiles; Paper sector seems to be an exception here, but the results could
also be driven by the considerably smaller sample size as compared to all other
sectors. In summary, the results from this section do not indicate that the
baseline results are driven by one or a few sectors.
4.4.3 Robustness Checks
The number of clusters in the sample is 34, corresponding to the 34 OECD
countries. This is close to the critical number of 30 clusters, for which Cameron
and Miller (2015) propose the use of bootstrapping techniques to obtain correct
standard errors. Implementing such percentile-t bootstrapping procedures does
not change the significance of the results, leading to the conclusion that the
cluster robust standard errors of the baseline model are valid.13 In the follow-
ing, two alternative models are introduced to confirm the robustness of the main
13Results are available from the author upon request.
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results.
Count Data Model
The data at hand are discrete count data, so taking the logarithm and treating
the variable as continuous could lead to biased results. To hedge against this
concern, the analysis is rerun using a negative binomial count data model. The
negative binomial model is preferred to a poisson model because it allows the
data to be overdispersed, whilst the poisson model assumes equality of mean and
variance (equidispersion). More specifically, a NegBin II model, as proposed by
Cameron and Trivedi (1986), is estimated using the counts of the total number
of patents, the number of home developed patents and the number of foreign
developed patents.14
Table 4.7 shows the results of estimating the negative binomial model for
case Weighted, using either the IP-Box dummy or the tax benefit as explanatory
variable, alongside the same control variables as before. The results support the
pattern found in the baseline regressions: The effect on the total number of
patents is negative but not statistically significant, the introduction of an IP-
Box regime reduces the number of home developed patents and increases the
number of foreign developed patents. Overall, the results are very similar to
the baseline specification, which indicates that the log-linearisation of the data
introduces no bias in the full sample.
Given the sectoral heterogeneity in the data, as displayed in Tables 4.5 and
4.6, Table 4.8 shows the negative binomial regressions per sector for the IP-Box
dummy. The pattern observed in Table 4.5 is also present and even intensified,
leading to the conclusion that the treatment of the count data as continuous
might have been wrong in the per sector analysis. The reason for this is the
14Results from a poisson model with robust standard errors to account for overdispersion
are available from the author upon request.
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Table 4.7: Count Data Model - Full sample (Case Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Home Foreign
IP-Box -0.101 -0.317** 1.108*
(0.192) (0.162) (0.574)
Tax benefit -1.095* -1.604** 3.457
(0.596) (0.739) (2.288)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.210 -0.171 -0.329 -0.286 0.334 0.498
(1.701) (1.705) (1.706) (1.702) (1.175) (1.250)
GDP per Capita 1.898*** 1.887*** 2.050*** 2.018*** 0.878** 0.978**
(0.437) (0.429) (0.430) (0.425) (0.360) (0.475)
Unemployment 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.039** 0.039** 0.075** 0.076**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.031)
N 569 569 569 569 569 569
Notes: Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers only patents
developed in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indicates
that the patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time- and
country-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in par-
enthesis. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
smaller number of counts in the per sector analysis and the increase in the num-
ber of zeros that are not modeled correctly in the log-linearised baseline model.
In most sectors, the number of foreign developed patents increased after the in-
troduction of an IP-Box regime. The effects on the number of home developed
patents as well as the total number of patents are mostly insignificant and in
case of the total number of patents ambiguous between the sectors.
Binomial Regression Model
In the previous estimations, the effects were measured for home and foreign
developed patents separately and it was difficult to control for a change in the
number of patents induced by the IP-Box, because both home and foreign de-
veloped patents constitute a fraction of total patents. But this relationship can
be exploited in a binomial regression framework, where it is possible to account
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Table 4.8: Per Sector Analysis (Case Weighted)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Home Foreign N
Coefficient: IP-Box Dummy
A: Human Necessities -0.114 -0.051 0.707** 801,291
(0.211) (0.219) (0.306)
B: Performing Operations; Transporting 0.180 0.122 0.575** 2,037,537
(0.314) (0.379) (0.268)
C: Chemistry; Metallurgy -0.158* -0.162 0.671 1,321,558
(0.199) (0.228) (0.516)
D: Textiles; Paper 0.338** 0.091 1.212*** 297,315
(0.149) (0.234) (0.347)
E: Fixed Constructions 0.245 0.235 0.935*** 538,571
(0.292) (0.273) (0.275)
F: Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating 0.181 0.082 0.677*** 1,193,086
(0.221) (0.241) (0.167)
G: Physics 0.054 -0.013 0.913** 1,595,945
(0.291) (0.344) (0.375)
H: Electricity 0.086 -0.007 0.795** 1,432,381
(0.213) (0.238) (0.368)
Notes: The table shows the value of the coefficient on the IP-Box dummy for the negative
binomial model, carried out for a sub sample of each sector separately. Sectors are defined as
per top-level IPC classification. N gives the number of patents in the sample in the respective
sector. Total refers to the total number of patents filed, Home considers only patents de-
veloped in the same country as the patent applicant resides in and Foreign indicates that the
patents were developed abroad. All specifications include a full set of time- and country-fixed
effects. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parenthesis. *,** and
*** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
129
4.4. RESULTS
for changes in the number of patents by conditioning on the total number of
patents. In essence, the outcome variable is seen as the sum of n successful
Bernoulli trials and the coefficients will indicate how the chances of success are
influenced by the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010).
In the setting at hand, the total number of Bernoulli trials is the total number
of patents applied for in year t in country i. For ease of interpretation, success is
defined as the number of times that the patent is developed abroad.15 Therefore,
the probability that a given patent is developed in a foreign country is given by
p = (Foreign/Total) and 1− p is the probability that a patent, conditional on
the total number of patents, is developed at home. The coefficients presented
below thus show the effect of the explanatory variables on the probability that
a patent is developed in a foreign country. The results are given in odds ratios,
so any coefficient greater than 1 will indicate that the variable positively influ-
ences the chances of success (i.e. of a foreign developed patent). Likewise, a
ratio smaller than 1 indicates that the chances of success are hampered by that
variable and the probability of a home developed patent rises.
Table 4.9 shows the estimation results from the binomial regression model.
Column (1) displays the coefficient estimates for the IP-Box dummy in the
various samples. In the full sample, the chances that a newly developed patent
is from abroad are increased by 73% in countries that have an IP-Box regime
in place. By the complementarity of the probabilities, the chances that a new
patent is developed in the home country are reduced by 73%. In column (2),
the odds ratios for a unit change in the tax benefit are presented. Because
the tax benefit takes on a value between 0 and 1, the odds ratio is hard to
15Defining the number of home developed patents as success will lead to the exact same
conclusions, as it is the complementary probability. The results will be in odds ratios and
the interpretation of an odds ratio < 1 is more cumbersome than the interpretation of a ratio
> 1. Given the baseline results, a pattern where the odds ratio is greater than 1 is expected
for the foreign applications.
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Table 4.9: Binomial Regression Model (Case Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) N
IP-Box Taxbenefit Taxbenefit*100
Full Sample 1.730** 9.296* 1.023* 569
A: Human Necessities 1.938** 13.705** 1.027** 568
B: Performing Operations; Transporting 1.442 3.947 1.014 568
C: Chemistry; Metallurgy 1.677 6.048 1.018 568
D: Textiles; Paper 1.831 27.374* 1.034* 499
E: Fixed Constructions 2.335** 26.862** 1.033** 544
F: Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating 1.497 4.803 1.016 552
G: Physics 1.818* 9.592 1.023 557
H: Electricity 1.516 4.867 1.016 542
Notes: The coefficients represent odds ratios for the different samples. Taxbenefit*100 is the
tax rate differential multiplied with 100, which allows the coefficient to show the effect of a one
percentage point change, rather than the 100 percentage point change that is shown in column
(2). *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level respectively.
interpret. Therefore, in column (3), the tax benefit variable in the regression
is multiplied by 100, to allow the interpretation in terms of a one percentage
point change in the tax benefit. For the full sample, a one percentage point
increase in the tax benefit leads to a 2.3% higher probability that a new patent
is developed abroad. Across the different sectors, considerable heterogeneity is
again observable, but not a single odds ratio is smaller than one, indicating that
the probability of a home developed patent is never positively affected by the
IP-Box regime. Either, the IP-Box regime significantly enhances the chances of
a foreign developed patent or there is no significant effect of the IP-Box regime
on the probabilities that a patent is developed at home or in a foreign country,
conditional on the total number of patents.
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4.5 Conclusion
Governments implementing IP-Box regimes highlight that the IP-Boxes are de-
signed as an ex-post incentive to foster R&D. This study has shown that, at
least within the implementing country, IP-Boxes have failed to spur on innov-
ation. More specifically, evidence for a crowding out of R&D from the country
that implemented an IP-Box regime was found. A rationale for this can be seen
in the ability of a MNE to differentiate between the location of innovation and
the location of application of a patent. Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2016) and
Beer (2015) report positive spillover effects of IP-Boxes and R&D tax incentives
for other countries and so globally, it is unclear whether the effect of IP-Boxes
on innovation is truly negative. This should be the subject of future research.
A second channel that was identified in the literature is supported by the
results of this study. IP-Boxes that grant a substantially lower tax rate on intan-
gible assets like patents and other intellectual property, attract foreign developed
patents. This channel of attracting foreign R&D is lucrative for governments as
it brings in new tax revenues, which previously accrued somewhere else. There-
fore, from an economic point of view, introducing an IP-Box regime can be a
viable measure for a government seeking to increase its budget.
As a policy recommendation, IP-Boxes should not be presented as a tool to
foster innovation. They seem to have a negative effect on innovation in the home
country and the effect on a global level remains unclear. Some improvements to
the design IP-Boxes can be made: Including a development condition is a crucial
asset of an IP-Box regime, as this at least requires some form of innovation to
take place and could help to improve the image of IP-Boxes as a R&D incentive.
The BEPS Action Plan and especially the modified nexus approach have kick-
started a range of modifications to existing IP-Box regimes, all aimed at ensuring
a minimum level of economic activity in the country where the applicant resides.
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This could ultimately improve the capabilities of IP-Boxes to foster innovation.
In the current form, though, IP-Boxes are just another profit shifting device
that quite rightly came under scrutiny of the European Commission in recent
times.
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4.A Loss in Home Developed Patents with Cost
If the cost of developing a patent is not tax deductable, the profit functions in
countries A and B are given by
PA = (E[piA]− cA)(1− τA)
and
PB = E[piB](1− τA)− cB(1− τB).
An increase in the net-of-tax rate (corresponding to a decrease in the tax
rate itself) will yield an increase in profits from a patent developed in country
A of E[piA] − cA and an increase of profits from a patent developed in country
B of E[piB]. For any positive cost of developing a patent (cA > 0), the gain
in country B is strictly greater than the gain in country A, given that we have
assumed E[piB] > E[piA]. Therefore, the results prevailing when regarding tax
exemption of costs provide an upper bound for the net-of-tax rate, in the sense
that any higher net-of-tax rate will always induce the MNE to develop the patent
in country B. The lower the tax deductibility of expenses, the higher the critical
τ IPA will be.
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4.B Member States of the European Patent Or-
ganisation
Country Date of Entry Country Date of Entry
Belgium 7 October 1977 Turkey 1 November 2000
Germany 7 October 1977 Bulgaria 1 July 2002
France 7 October 1977 Czech Republic 1 July 2002
Luxembourg 7 October 1977 Estonia 1 July 2002
The Netherlands 7 October 1977 Slovakia 1 July 2002
Switzerland 7 October 1977 Slovenia 1 December 2002
United Kingdom 7 October 1977 Hungary 1 January 2003
Sweden 1 May 1978 Romania 1 March 2003
Italy 1 December 1978 Poland 1 March 2004
Austria 1 May 1979 Iceland 1 November 2004
Liechtenstein 1 April 1980 Lithuania 1 December 2004
Greece 1 October 1986 Latvia 1 July 2005
Spain 1 October 1986 Malta 1 March 2007
Denmark 1 January 1990 Croatia 1 January 2008
Monaco 1 December 1991 Norway 1 January 2008
Portugal 1 January 1992 FYR Macedonia 1 January 2009
Ireland 1 August 1992 San Marino 1 July 2009
Finland 1 March 1996 Albania 1 May 2010
Cyprus 1 April 1998 Serbia 1 October 2010
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Conclusion
Summary
The thesis at hand set out to comprehensively analyse a broad variety of tax
policy instruments. The intention was a multidimensional analysis, spanning
both individual and corporate taxation, tax schedules, incentives and disincent-
ives, whilst focussing on the EU as the playing field. Chapter 2 was dedicated
to the individual tax schedule in the Netherlands, the third chapter showed how
anti-avoidance measures like transfer pricing regulations (TPR) as a disincentive
device affect firm behaviour and the fourth chapter was dedicated to the analysis
of a tax rate reduction in the form of an intellectual property box (IP-Box), thus
covering corporate taxation and incentives.
From the analysis in the second chapter, it became evident that individuals
react to jumps in the marginal tax rate. The bunching behaviour of individuals
at those kink points in the budget set was exploited to identify the elasticity
of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate. The chapter first
provided an extension to the classical bunching approach introduced by Saez
(2010) and extended by Chetty et al. (2011). Because individuals face optim-
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isation frictions, perfect bunching at the kink as predicted by theory was not
observable. Rather, a window around the kink, known as the bunching window,
was used in the analysis. Where prior research had relied on visual inspection
to determine the size of the bunching window, the chapter proposed a data-
driven procedure instead, which was shown to be robust to variations in various
parameters and took away the researchers discretion in that matter. Thus, the
chapter provided a methodological contribution to a comparably young, but
growing field of research.
The results from the bunching analysis of the Dutch tax schedule revealed
that individuals react to changes in the marginal tax rate, albeit very inelast-
ically. Subsample analyses, however, showed substantial heterogeneity between
employed and self-employed individuals as well as between men and women.
Self-employed and women exhibit a far larger ETI than their respective com-
parison groups. Having identified bunching behaviour of Dutch individuals,
the study proceeded with analysing the question of how taxable income was
adjusted. Of the four potential channels1 to adjust taxable income, the utilisa-
tion of deduction possibilities and in particular the shifting of mortgage interest
rate deductions between fiscal partners was identified as main instrument. By
contrast, an analysis exploiting the hours worked in 2011 did not reveal any sig-
nificant reactions, thus suggesting that the adjustment of labour supply plays
no significant role for reducing taxable income, at least in paid employment.
Income shifting over time and tax evasion remain potential channels that were
not subject to analysis due to data constraints.
After empirically showing the reaction of individuals to changes in the mar-
ginal tax rate, the thesis set its sights on corporate taxation and the efficiency
of anti-avoidance measures. The empirical literature has shown that MNEs util-
1adjustment of labour supply, utilisation of deductions, income shifting and tax evasion
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ise transfer prices to shift profits into (out of) low-tax (high-tax) jurisdictions.
Several countries have implemented regulations that limit the manipulation of
transfer prices, most often demanding that they should be set at an arm’s-length,
i.e. be similar to prices agreed with unrelated third parties. Evidence was given
in prior literature that MNEs react sensitively to the introduction of TPR in
reducing (increasing) their prices when they were overvalued (undervalued) be-
fore the implementation of regulations. Surprisingly, a reaction in quantities,
i.e. shifts in production and trade flows, had not been analysed in the literature
before. Chapter 3 aimed at providing a first analysis of the reaction of quantities
to TPR. The results indicated a substantial quantity reaction and also a pricing
reaction, which was shown to be in line with the literature. This suggests that
before the introduction of TPR, firms shift more exports to low tax countries
and less exports to high tax countries for tax optimising purposes. Following
the introduction of TPR, especially the reduction in quantities traded with low
tax countries was identified.
Another aspect pointed out by the analyses in Chapter 3 was the importance
of the interplay between different anti-avoidance measures. Especially controlled
foreign company (CFC) rules and TPR were identified as partial complements,
although none of the instruments can fully replace the other. Thin capitalisation
rules (TCR), on their own or in combination with other instruments, play a lesser
role in the shifting of quantities. This was to be expected as they focus on certain
minimum requirements of capitalisation within a firm, thus purely affecting
financing of a firm and not its production decision. In summary, TPR seemed to
ease allocative inefficiencies that arose from the manipulation of transfer prices
by MNEs on top of the changes in the tax base due to pricing adjustments.
Whilst Chapter 3 focussed on the reaction of firms to a disincenitve, Chapter
4 asked the question of how firms react to incentives of a tax system. The
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introduction of this thesis already highlighted the importance and widespread
implementation of R&D incentives across Europe. Whilst most incentives are
ex ante tax incentives, i.e. incentives that act during the innovation process and
before the innovative product was developed, IP-Boxes, analysed in Chapter 4,
are an ex post tax incentive, thus only benefiting successful R&D. The analysis
attempted to explore whether IP-Boxes are a local innovation enhancing device,
as propagated by the countries implementing IP-Boxes, or merely facilitate profit
shifting for MNEs by offering a substantially lower tax rate on income from
intellectual property.
The results clearly showed that the shifting channel dominates the home
innovation channel. Some evidence was found that home developed patents
were crowded out by foreign developed and subsequently shifted patents. The
total number of patents did not seem to react to the introduction of IP-Boxes,
thus even questioning the global innovation enhancing effect of IP-Boxes. Given
the nature of the data, it was not possible to investigate the different designs
of IP-Boxes more thoroughly, although the implementation of a development
condition should be part of every IP-Box regime. This would ensure that, at
least from a global or even European perspective, innovation must take place
somewhere.
Implications and Extensions
Individuals as well as corporations react to any form of taxation. Except for
some very special cases2, these behavioural responses lead to inefficiencies. In
order to be able to minimise these inefficiencies, it is important to study the
extent of the behavioural responses, which was at the heart of this thesis. The
2Perfectly inelastic demand/supply or non-distortionary taxes such as lump sum taxation.
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results indicate that corporations react more elastically to changes in the tax
schedule, which is in line with the common finding that firms are more rational
than individuals, less prone to optimisation errors and have more shifting pos-
sibilities. This suggests that distortions are larger when firms form the tax base
and therefore, from an efficiency point of view, taxation of firms should be lower
than taxation of individuals. This rule is implemented in nearly all European
tax schedules3, where the top marginal tax rate for individuals is as high or
higher than the statutory corporate tax rate.
Chapter 2 analysed the Dutch tax system that is characterised by four tax
brackets. The respective elasticities found locally around the upper threshold
are modest at most. Further explorations into the anatomy of response showed
that this is due to the shifting of deduction possibilities between partners and
a real response in terms of hours worked could not be inferred from the data
for the population in paid employment. This allows me to conclude that a
tax system with tax brackets is not likely to be less efficient than a smoothly
increasing progressive tax schedule like in Germany or a flat tax regime that is
in place in several Eastern European countries. The story would be different,
however, if the tax schedule exhibited notches instead of kinks. As Kleven and
Waseem (2013) showed for Pakistan, notches induce a more severe behavioural
response and therefore, such tax systems can be seen as less efficient.
Another aspect of a tax system analysed in this study is the scope of anti-
avoidance measures for corporate taxation. Especially when the tax base is
mobile and spread out over several countries, firms can utilise the differences in
tax rates across the locations of their subsidiary firms to minimise the effective
tax burden. A predominant way of shifting profits between entities was the
manipulation of transfer prices. Several countries have implemented measures
3Czech Republic and Hungary being the notable exceptions.
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to counter the excessive manipulation of transfer prices, mostly by tying them
to an arm’s-length price. Although the results of Chapter 3 indicate that TPR
were effective in reducing the misreporting of prices as well as the inefficient
allocation of quantities, the arm’s-length price remains hard to determine in
certain specialised industries that are characterised by high shares of intra-firm
trade, such as the automobile industry. As some studies have shown, firms also
alter their arm’s-length prices to hide the true extent of their profit shifting
activities (Cristea and Nguyen, 2013). Future research, especially on the design
of tax legislation, should therefore concentrate on finding alternative and more
efficient measures to determine a comparable price for the transfer prices set by
firms.
Tax schedules also offer a wide range of incentives, either by tax cuts or tar-
geted subsidies. These are, from an efficiency point of view, desirable when the
market outcome is unsatisfactory. For example R&D can be classified as a pub-
lic good and given the characteristics of public goods, underprovision through
the free riding mechanism is likely. Because R&D is substantial to economic
development, a government wants to increase spending on R&D by using the
tax scheme to set incentives for investment in R&D by firms. One of these in-
centives is the IP-Box, which allows income from patents and sometimes other
intellectual property to be taxed at a considerably lower rate than other income.
The results of Chapter 4 clearly indicate that the main effect of IP-Boxes is the
attraction of foreign developed patents, in most cases at the expense of patents
developed within the country that offers the IP-Box. If the goal of IP-Boxes is
to foster innovation, locally or globally, it is necessary that a development con-
dition becomes mandatory for the design of an IP-Box regime. In the sample
under consideration, only Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands had such a
condition in their definition of the IP-Box and simultaneously did not grant
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the lower tax rate for existing or acquired intellectual property. A solution to
the tax competition problem within the EU that is aggravated by the IP-Box
regimes could be an EU-wide IP-Box, where the tax revenue could flow into the
EU budget. This will have positive effects once it is established that IP-Boxes
increase innovation at least somewhere in the EU. On the other hand, it would
also mean that national taxation rights would need to be transferred to the EU,
which has not been feasible in the past.
Final Words
Taxation is at the heart of modern welfare states. The quest for an efficient
tax system remains an important topic in public finance and tax systems have
changed little since the early days of civilisation. The Ancient Egyptians as well
as subsequent civilisations through to the Middle Ages relied mostly on flat taxes
such as the tithe and flat tax systems have survived to this day, especially in
Eastern Europe. A problem with flat taxes is that they are proportionate rather
than progressive, so when equity concerns matter, a progressive tax system
with increasing marginal tax rates, as implemented in most other European
countries, should be preferable. The Ancient Romans literally set up a tax
haven to cripple the economic prosperity of Rhodes. Tax havens still exist
around the world today and operate on the same principles as 2,200 years ago:
They offer a substantially lower or even zero tax rate on corporate income to
attract foreign firms. Recently, countries have started to combat tax havens by
introducing transfer pricing regulations, as well as controlled foreign company
or thin capitalisation rules. The thesis at hand showed that these rules are
effective in reducing excessive profit shifting. Last but not least, the thesis
provided evidence that tax incentives, especially for risky investments such as
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investments in R&D, where an underprovision in absence of the tax incentive
is likely, are desirable. By analysing the effects of intellectual property boxes,
however, serious questions arose over the effectiveness of ex post tax incentives
and the focus of public policy should be on input related R&D incentives such
as direct subsidies or wage subsidies for employees in R&D, if the government
desires to increase innovation.
Next to the efficiency of tax systems that has been at the heart of this ex-
ploration, equity concerns play a crucial role in finding an optimal tax system.
Through the equity-efficiency trade-off, any redistributional considerations in-
duce inefficiencies into the tax system. The goal of any optimal public policy
should therefore be to fix the desired level of redistribution in a first stage and
subsequently, conditional on the desired scope of redistribution, find the taxa-
tion instrument that comes with the minimum additional inefficiency. In other
words, to find an optimal tax system, policymakers should accept finding a
second best solution in terms of efficiency at the benefit of a desired level of
equity.
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